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LOVE DOESN'T PAY: THE FICTION OF MARRIAGE
RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE
James A. Sonne *
"'[E]qual rights for all, special privileges for none."'
1 The battle
cry is well known. From founding struggles, through civil war, to
a civil rights era, "equal treatment under law" has sounded a
steady drumbeat in American history. It is so deeply rooted in
public discourse that it is no surprise that the debate over same-
sex marriage is seen by many as its latest chapter. Indeed, called
by some proponents as "'the civil rights struggle of our time,"'
2 the
effort to include same-sex couples in marriage has drawn a nation
to questions of equality, rights, and privilege.
3 A big problem for
such a movement, however, and for that matter, its opposition
too, is that one of the major areas of focus to this point-legal
rights and benefits at work 4 -has been vastly overstated and
sorely misunderstood. The reality, for better or worse, is that
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1. Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 
96
MICH. L. REV. 245, 256 (1997) (quoting Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and 
Liberty: A
Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 
3 LAW &
HIST. REV. 293, 318 (1985) (discussing Jeffersonian Republicans)).
2. Rabbi Devon Lerner, Why We Support Same-Sex Marriage: A Response From 
Over
450 Clergy, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 527, 529 (2004) (quoting Rabbi Howard Berman).
3. See, e.g., Shailagh Murray, Gay-Marriage Amendment Fails to Advance 
in the
Senate, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2004, at A4 (noting that the same-sex marriage 
issue "came
to a boil" in early 2004).
4. See, e.g., Kara S. Suffredini & Madeleine V. Findley, Speak Now: Progressive 
Con-
siderations on the Advent of Civil Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, 45 B.C. L. REV. 595,
600, 606 (2004) (calling benefits at work 'critical"); Stephanie Armour, Gay Parents 
Cheer
a Benefit Revolution, USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 2005, at 1B (stating that "employee 
benefits are
key"); H.J. Cummins, Same-Sex Marriage: A Workplace Issue, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
June 12, 2004, at 1D (observing that "marriage is a huge employee-benefit 
issue"); Gay
Marriage in Massachusetts (NPR radio broadcast, May 12, 2004), 
available at
http://www.npr.orgtemplates/story/story.php?storyId=18
9 4 0 0 6 ) (discussing claim that
"most significant" gay marriage issues arise on the job) (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
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marriage-based workplace inequalities, which exist to an extent,
simply do not rise to the levels supposed by either side; nor do
they provide the imprimatur for marriage many assume. As a re-
sult, not only is the workplace a virtual "red herring" in the de-
bate, but the very idea of marriage in this context is given cur-
sory, emotional treatment, leaving it largely unexplored in any
systemic fashion. In response, this article strives to fill the void
by examining in a comprehensive manner the rights and benefits
that actually do exist, their origins and purposes, and the conclu-
sions that can be drawn therefrom, for both the workplace and
the contemporary marriage debate.
The benefits of marriage are myriad. From the sublime joy of
unifying love to the mundane sharing of chores, marriage yields a
host of gifts to its participants. To be sure, such benefits do not
arise without a corresponding set of duties and responsibilities.
Yet, few would dispute that, at least as understood in modern
America, marriage is a desirable state that increases the health
and happiness of couples, families, and society.5 In light of this
reality, federal, state, and local laws offer many rights and bene-
fits that aim to support the institution. Surprisingly, though, one
place where direct support is largely absent (or, at least, mar-
ginal) is at work. Although it may shock some, especially those
waging the current "marriage wars," the law offers few workplace
rights and benefits to marriage in itself. To be sure, there is some
legal treatment, but it is largely limited to indirect public benefits
(e.g., tax, Social Security)6 that are rooted more in presumptions
of economic dependency, and corresponding child-rearing,7 than
any objective value of marriage, and, as such, are not even useful
to most modern couples to the degree both partners prefer to
5. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 225
(2000) ("The preeminent stature of marriage in public opinion is not unwarranted because
it still is a public institution, building in material rewards along with obligations. History
and tradition cement the hold of marriage on individual desires and social ideals.") (em-
phasis added); LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 77 (2000)
("[Tihe key seems to be the marriage bond itself: Having a partner who is committed for
better or for worse, in sickness and in health, makes people happier and healthier.").
6. See generally Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue
Code, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 465 (2000) (discussing general tax consequences of marriage, in-
cluding provisions on income, gifts, and estates). See also Social Security Act of 1935, 42
U.S.C. § 402(b), (c) (2000) (spousal payment options).
7. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Benefits, Nonmarital Status, and the Homosexual
Agenda, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 379, 385-86 (2002) (describing implicit preference for sin-
gle wage-earners with children in both federal Social Security and the federal tax code).
[Vol. 40:867
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work-and would also be of little use to most unmarried pairs, if
so offered, for the same reason." In general, the law demands no
marital wage,9 no health or pension benefits,
1" and no paid job
leave," and, at least in the federal system, there is not even a bar
to marriage discrimination. 2 In fact, to the extent marriage
rights or benefits are obtained at all, most are provided voluntar-
ily by employers in response to the market, not the law.'
3
In addressing the foregoing, this article proceeds in six parts.
Part I introduces the treatment of marriage in modern law and
culture. Part II traces the origins and history of legal approaches
to marriage in the workplace, from federal, state, and local per-
spectives. Part III, which forms the bulk of the article, canvasses
the current state of marriage law at work-as far as it goes. Part
IV describes voluntary efforts taken by employers regarding mar-
riage and explores the role they may have in confusing legal
rights with market benefits. Part V gives theoretical insights for
marriage at work as seen from the legal, cultural, and economic
lenses of the preceding parts. Part VI offers a brief conclusion.
In short, this article posits that, at least on the job, the law is
not the haven for marriage that many assume it to be. Benefits
and rights do exist, but more as the result of personal choice than
of law. Given that modern marriage has increasingly taken the
form of a pair of co-equal partners making their own private
8. See id. (noting little benefit to dual-income couples in Social Security and 
income
tax systems).
9. See William Quigley, Full-Time Workers Should Not Be Poor: The Living 
Wage
Movement, 70 MISS. L.J. 889, 89-99, 923-31 (2001) (noting lack of federal "living" 
or family
wage, and indicating, by reference, that any such wages required by local ordinance 
are
not paid based on marital status or actual family size).
10. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983) (observing that 
fed-
eral employee benefits law "does not mandate that employers provide any particular 
bene-
fits").
11. See Arline Friscia, The Worker-Funded Leave Act: The Time is Now to Help Build
Stronger Families With a More Stable Economy, 26 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 73, 74 (2001)
(noting that the United States "is one of the only countries that does not provide 
paid fam-
ily leave").
12. See Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781, 783 (E.D. La. 1967) 
("It is
plain that Congress [has] not ban[ned] discrimination in employment due to one's 
marital
status. . ").
13. See Lynne Marie Kohm, Does Marriage Make Good Business?: Examining the 
No-
tion of Employer Endorsement of Marriage, 25 WHITTIER L. REv. 563, 582 
(2004) ("Em-
ployer encouragement of a good, stable, healthy marriage is neither legal nor illegal: 
it is
good employment practice. . . ."); see also id. at 567 ("Ultimately, employer endorsement 
of
marriage yields happy and productive employees.").
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choices about the "mystery of human life"14 rather than a state-
regulated public affair intrinsically connected to children, it is
perhaps only logical that its role at work has become more the
domain of such partners than of law. Indeed, in the end, marriage
is seen, at least in this arena, largely as a private choice that is
assisted only to the extent it serves both the individual and the
job at issue-and, in light of modern norms of marriage generally,
maybe this should not be all that surprising.
I. TAKING THE PULSE: MARRIAGE, LAW, AND CULTURE
Implicit in the modern debate on same-sex marriage is the no-
tion that, whatever its definition or application, marriage is
something that merits a fairly high degree of sanction, protection,
and respect in both culture and law. On the cultural side, the
signs of support are ubiquitous. From the fact that couples now
spend an average of $21,000 on a wedding, 5 to census data indi-
cating that "In]early everyone marries,"16 to continued cultural
contempt for adultery, 7 to the very high level of interest attached
to the same-sex marriage issue itself'8 (even to the point of an
impassioned constitutional debate on both the federal and nu-
merous state levels that many analysts credit for the outcome of
14. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
15. See Wedding Bills Are Ringing Up, CHI. TRIB., June 10, 2004, at 15.
16. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION
OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 1996, at 16 (2002) [hereinafter, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES] ("Between 80 and 90 percent of men and women age 15 in
1996 are projected to marry by the end of their lives."), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2002pubs/p70-80.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
17. See Lydia Saad, The Cultural Landscape: What's Morally Acceptable?, GALLUP
POLL NEWS SERV., June 22, 2004 (discussing polling data from May 2004 indicating that
ninety-one percent of Americans consider adultery to be "morally wrong"), available athttp://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=12061&VERSION=p (last visited Feb. 17,
2006).
18. See YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION
OF GAY PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 1 (2002) ("The idea of providing
rights to same-sex couples in general, and the prospect of opening up the institution of
marriage to gay men and lesbians in particular, have instigated an extremely heated pub-
lic debate .... ."); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV.
1419, 1484 (1993) ("[G]aylaw has insisted that the state not only tolerate same-sex unions,
but recognize them as marriages, or at least as something marriage-like. . . ."); Harbour
Fraser Hodder, The Future of Marriage, HARV. MAG., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 39 (citing Nancy
Cott in opining that the "two ends of the spectrum" on the marriage debate agree on "how
crucial it is as a social institution").
[Vol. 40:867
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the 2004 presidential election),' 9 one is forced to conclude that the
pursuit of, or the inclusion in, the marital state is viewed by soci-
ety as something that is quite worthwhile and important. This is
the case notwithstanding historic increases in rates of divorce in
both the 1970s and 1980s,2 ° seismic shifts in societal views on
various matters of sexual morality,2 and the growing approval of
certain "marriage alternatives," such as domestic partnerships or
unmarried cohabitation. 22 Indeed, the image of marriage gener-
ally has seen a radical transformation in the latter part of the
twentieth century, from "[flamily solidarity and the community of
life" to "primarily the concern of the individuals involved."23 Yet,
the primacy of this union of two persons, and the strength of its
pursuit, remains. 24 As one analyst noted recently, "'while mar-
riages may fail, the will to be married endures.' 25
As one might expect from this continued support for marriage
in culture, however bruised, battered, or differently interpreted it
might be, the law has followed (or, perhaps at times, has led)26 in
a correspondingly supportive fashion-at least formally. After all,
19. See James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some G.O.P. Races, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2004, at P4 (describing same-sex marriage issue as "crucial" to 2004 election, par-
ticularly in Ohio); Paul Farhi & James V. Grimaldi, GOP Won With Accent on Rural and
Traditional, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at A01 (analyzing impact of marriage on 2004 elec-
tion).
20. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES, supra note 16, at 3, 4 tbl.1
(describing "marital pattern for the last half of the twentieth century" as one of more di-
vorce and later marriage); Developments in the Law-The Law of Marriage and Family,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2075 (2003) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] ("[W]hile the
institution of marriage has continued to dominate, divorce law has become increasingly
relevant .... ).
21. See Saad, supra note 17 (noting 2004 poll's sixty percent approval of"sex between
an unmarried man and woman").
22. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 5, at 36 (noting that "cohabitation is now
more popular than ever" in that as of 2000 "eight times as many" couples lived together
outside of marriage than did in 1970).
23. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND
FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 291, 293 (1989).
24. See id. at 293 (observing that modern family law "remains marriage-centered in
many ways").
25. Cheryl Wetztein, Marriage Savers' Counties Speed Divorce Rate Dip; Grass-Roots
Guidance Program Shows "Extraordinary Results," WASH. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2004, at A02; see
also Lynne Marie Kohm, Marriage and the Intact Family: The Significance of Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 327, 378 (2000) ("Marriage as a conventional social and
legal institution has undergone serious and substantial attack ... yet it still stands strong
26. See Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1971, 1971-72
(2000) (discussing the "tangled" relationship of law and culture in marriage, and the "per-
ceived legitimacy of law" in that setting).
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whether the positive law guides the underlying culture or it is the
other way around,2 7 one should not be surprised to find that law
and culture reflect on one another in the marriage context in a
manner that communicates continued respect and sanction for
the institution, despite significant upheaval and change. The Su-
preme Court has called marriage "one of the 'basic civil rights of
man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival."2 8 "From
the founding of the United States to the present day, assumptions
about the importance of marriage and its appropriate form have
been deeply implanted in public policy,"29 particularly as it con-
cerns children.3 ° In this way, laws on marriage "transform a pri-
vate agreement into a source of significant public benefits and
protections,"31 as well as related responsibilities. Although one
might infer from the current marriage debate that there is no
conventionally accepted or "appropriate form," marriage as a so-
cial, cultural, or political phenomenon is heightened only further
(rightly or wrongly) by such debate.32 Thus, even this fight itself
bears witness to the importance of the values and prize at stake.
With the foregoing in mind, how exactly does the current law
support this cultural preference for the institution of marriage,
whatever its present state or definition? At present, there are
"more than one thousand places in the corpus of federal law
where legal marriage confer[s] a distinctive status, right, or bene-
fit,"33 or, at the least, where "marital status is a factor."34 These
27. See Francis Cardinal George, O.M.I., Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 4
(2003) (noting the "chicken and the egg" challenge in "thinking about law and culture").
28. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942)).
29. COTT, supra note 5, at 2.
30. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (assuming marriage to be the "foun-
dation of the family").
31. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 883 (Vt. 1999).
32. Compare Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA.
L. REV. 129, 197 (1998) (noting that in the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), where
marriage in federal law is defined as between "one man and one woman," Congress found
that "same-sex marriage would 'belittle,' 'demean,' 'trivialize,' and ultimately destroy real
marriage"), and Robert H. Bork, The Necessary Amendment, FIRST THINGS, Aug.-Sept.
2004, at 17 (predicting "nuclear" fallout from Supreme Court approval of same-sex mar-
riage), with COTT, supra note 5, at 225 (noting that the same-sex marriage fight "has,
ironically, clothed the formal institution with renewed honor"), and John G. Culhane, Up-
rooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20 CARDOzO L. REV. 1119, 1189 (1999)
("Marriage might actually receive a boost from the infusion of same-sex couples.").
33. COTT, supra note 5, at 2 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/OGC-97-16
DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT (1997) [hereinafter 1997 GAO REPORT]); see also U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-353R DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR
[Vol. 40:867
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thousand-plus federal laws on, or legal references to, marriage in-
clude: (1) income, estate, and gift taxation rates, deductions, ex-
emptions, and credits;35 (2) medical, housing, and other public
health/welfare programs;36 (3) immigration priorities;37 (4) Social
Security (including Medicare) rights for spouses and widow(er)s; 3"
(5) veterans' survivor benefits;39 (6) pension protections;" (7) pub-
lic civil servant rights and benefits;
41 and (8) unpaid job leave,
42
among others.43 Most of these laws are restricted, at least at pre-
sent, to legally married male-female couples by way of the 1996
Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), which defines "marriage" for
federal law purposes as "a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife."44
The spectrum of federal provisions just listed, of course, does
not even include the thousands of state and local laws, which are
the primary sources of marital rights and obligations. 45 The most
REPORT (2004) (updating 1997 GAO REPORT).
34. Theodora Ooms, Commentary, The Role of the Federal Government in Strengthen-
ing Marriage, 9 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 163, 169 (2001) (describing 1997 GAO Report as
covering laws "in which marital status is a factor, even though the laws may not directly
create benefits, rights or privileges").
35. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1(a)-(b) (2000) (providing relevant income tax rates for married
individuals and "head of household" taxpayers, respectively); id. § 151(b) (providing
spousal exemption).
36. See, e.g., Ooms, supra note 34, at 172-73 (describing efforts by the federal gov-
ernment in 1996 to "strengthen the institution of marriage" by reforming federal welfare
and related block grants to states).
37. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (ex-
cluding spouses from being required to meet the criteria employed to determine and limit
immigration status or admittance).
38. See, e.g., Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)-(b) (2000) (outlining
spousal Social Security).
39. See, e.g., Veterans' Administration and Department of Defense Health Resources
Sharing and Emergency Operations Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1115, 1121, 1141 (2000) (out-
lining relevant disability and death benefits provided to spouses of military veterans).
40. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)
(2000) (restricting ability of employee to change pension beneficiary or otherwise waive
spousal rights).
41. See, e.g., Civil Service Act, 5 U.S.C. § 6382(a)(1) (2000) (discussing job leave); id. §
8109(a)(3)(D) (explaining workers' compensation survival benefits); id. § 8416(a)(2) (outlin-
ing spousal powers over retirement annuity).
42. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000) (entitling em-
ployee to leave for sick spouse).
43. See generally 1997 GAO REPORT, supra note 33 (listing "benefits, rights, and privi-
leges . . . contingent on marital status"); see also Lynne Marie Kohm, The Collateral Ef-
fects of Civil Unions on Family Law, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 451, 463-67 (2002) (describing
a "set of benefits conferred upon a spouse").
44. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
45. See James Herbie DiFonzo, Unbundling Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 61
2006]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
noteworthy of these laws concern: (1) the eligibility and validity of
marriage itself;46 (2) separation and divorce (including child cus-
tody issues);47 (3) property (e.g., community or common law, elec-
tive shares);4" (4) trusts and estates;49 (5) public welfare benefits
(e.g., survivor workers' compensation and unemployment com-
pensation relocation rights);5" (6) limited improvements in access
to health or life insurance;5' (7) tax rates, credits, exemptions, or
deductions; 2 and (8) the marital evidence privilege,5 3 among oth-
ers. Although many states and localities also have laws concern-
ing "marital status" discrimination,54 these typically protect both
the married and unmarried and, thus, although indicating a
measure of recognition otherwise lacking in federal law, can
largely be said to "support" marriage only by reference.55
(2003) (noting that the "incidents of marriage are generally governed by state law"); see
also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993) ("[R]egulat[ing] marriage is a sovereign
function reserved exclusively to the respective states.").
46. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 201 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 175-77
(1998) [hereinafter UMDA]. The UMDA has been substantially adopted in eight states
and, at least for the purposes of this discussion, is a typical model of state law on marriage
and divorce. See id. at 159; see also GLENDON, supra note 23, at 39 n.l (describing the
typicality and influence of the UMDA for state law purposes).
47. UMDA § 302 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 200-16 (1998); see also HOMER H. CLARK,
JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 590 n.6 (2d ed. 1988) (citing
property division statutes).
48. See Angela M. Vallario, Spousal Election: Suggested Equitable Reform for the Di-
vision of Property at Death, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 519, 522-26 (2003) (summarizing marital
property systems).
49. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102, 8 U.L.A. 81-82 (1993) (on spousal intestate
share); § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 139-42 (1998) (on spousal elective share); § 2-402 to -404 (on
homestead and other marriage-based property exemptions to estate divestiture). The Uni-
form Probate Code has been adopted, in whole or in part, by thirty-seven states. UNIF.
PROBATE CODE, 8 U.L.A. 1-8 (describing state enactments).
50. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3501(b) (West 2003) (presuming spouse to be a "de-
pendent" for workers' compensation death benefit); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West
Supp. 2005) (defining "good cause" termination for unemployment compensation to include
a move with spouse of an impracticable distance).
51. See, e.g., Baker, 744 A.2d at 884 (listing health and life insurance as marital bene-
fits).
52. See, e.g., Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59 (noting "variety of state income tax advantages [for
marriage], including deductions, credits, rates, exemptions, and estimates").
53. See id. (including marital evidence privilege among the "most salient marital
rights and benefits").
54. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
37.2102 (West 2001); N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (Consol. Cum. Supp. 2005).
55. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for Title
VII Protection, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 25 (2000) ("After all, marital status discrimination




Certainly, marriage has seen fairly significant challenges in
the form of increased divorce and the rise of domestic partner-
ships and cohabitation, and a tremendous shift has occurred
away from community interests and toward the individual in
modern concepts of marriage. 6 Further, there is little doubt that
such dynamic cultural shifts, whether one approves of them or
not, have been assisted, followed, and, at times, even led by vari-
ous corresponding changes in the law.57 Nevertheless, as just de-
scribed, a wide-ranging and unmistakable system of legal and
moral support for the institution of marriage, whatever its focus
or understanding, remains.58 The substance and emphasis may
have changed, and these changes, as explored below, have cer-
tainly made their mark. And yet, marriage remains, and largely
with its prominence in law and culture intact.
Notwithstanding these supports of marriage, however, the one
area where direct rights and benefits are less significant is on the
job. Indeed, of those noted above, the only laws that directly en-
hance rights and benefits at work are, on the federal side, unpaid
leave 9 and minor benefit protections, if benefits are offered at
all;6" and, on the state or local side, limited increases in insurance
access,6' the ability in some places to quit to move with a spouse
and still obtain unemployment benefits,62 workers' compensation
56. See GLENDON, supra note 23, at 1 (noting "unparalleled upheaval in... family law
systems"); id. at 291-93 (describing shift from family as community to family as a set of
personal, individual relationships).
57. See id. at 311 (arguing that the primary effect of modern family law reform has
been "to consolidate and, sometimes, increase the power of several [cultural] movements
that were already going forward").
58. See Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225,
270 (1997) (arguing that the "movement toward increasing personal autonomy... is still
sought within the [family] context"); see also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941, 967 (Mass. 2003) ("Marriage has survived all of these transformations [in the twenti-
eth century], and we have no doubt tnat marriage will continue to be a vibrant and re-
vered institution.").
59. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000) (requir-
ing leave for sick spouse).
60. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)
(2000); id. at § 116 1(a) (limit on waiver of spousal pension rights and health care continua-
tion, respectively, for existing plans).
61. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 393-7, 393-11 (1993) (requiring certain health care
for dependents); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 884 (Vt. 1999) (citing "opportunity" for
health or life insurance).
62. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West Cum. Supp. 2005) (defining "good
cause" termination).
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for survivors,6' and, at least referentially and in about half the
states, laws on "marital status" discrimination.' Many workers
also benefit from spouse provisions in Social Security,65 but such
"benefits" are neither direct, in that they "are not dependent
[up]on the degree" of contributions by employer or employee, nor
do they vest in any contract sense.66 Instead, they are a "general
welfare" expense funded by a tax based on Congressional judg-
ment as to retirement needs,67 a judgment which, incidentally, in-
cludes the distinct possibility that many two-income couples
(which describes most modern married pairs)6" receive no such
benefits at al169 -a reality that would prove all the more common
for presently unmarried couples if such "rights" were so ex-
tended.7°
One might argue that, at least to an extent, federal or state in-
come taxes also offer a "worker benefit" by their treatments of
marriage. Yet, as discussed below, not only are such taxes deriva-
tive (i.e., they treat income, not employment per se), they do not
give as high a preference to marriage in the labor arena as is gen-
erally assumed, 71 particularly for dual-income couples, which,
again, describes most modern married or unmarried pairs.7 ' Fur-
63. See, e.g., Baker, 744 A.2d at 884 (citing the workers' compensation "survivor bene-
fit").
64. See Porter, supra note 55, at 15-16 (listing twenty-one states and the District of
Columbia with "marital status" laws); Kohm, supra note 13, at 576-77 n.69 (noting same
number of jurisdictions as of 2004).
65. See, e.g., Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 402 (b)-(c), (e)-(f) (2000) (listing
spousal options).
66. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1960) ("[E]ach worker's [Social Se-
curity] benefits.., are not dependent on the degree to which he was called upon to sup-
port the system by taxation.").
67. See id. at 609 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937)).
68. See Marion Crain, "Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?" Marriage and Breadwin-
ning in Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1877, 1877-78 n.3 (1999) (citing data
showing most married pairs are dual-earning).
69. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Promoting Fairness in the Social Security Retirement
Program: Partial Integration and a Credit for Dual-Earner Couples, 45 TAX LAW. 915, 925
(1992) ("[U]nder the dual entitlement rule [of Social Security], when an individual can
claim both a worker's benefit and a benefit as an auxiliary [e.g., spouse] of another worker,
only the larger of the two benefits is paid to the individual.").
70. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 5, at 39 (noting economic independence of
unmarried couples).
71. See Cain, supra note 6, at 467 ("Recent reports [in 1997] indicate that approxi-
mately half the married couples filing tax returns report bonuses and half report penal-
ties."). But see Jamie Heller, How New Tax Law Relieves Marriage Penalty, WALL ST. J.,
June 4, 2003, at D2 (noting recent, limited marriage help).
72. See Cain, supra note 6, at 469 (explaining dual-earner tax effects); Crain, supra
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ther, civil servant benefits to public workers might also be seen as
relevant "rights,"73 but these are more like private employer poli-
cies than ones generally applicable to the public. Similarly, there
is no question that many private employers voluntarily offer mar-
riage-based benefits, including health care, life insurance, and
paid leave, 4 but again, these arise largely from private business
policy, not legal right or obligation.7"
Although at first glance the foregoing provisions might seem to
offer significantly more benefits to married employees than to the
unmarried, looks may be deceiving. For example, apart from un-
paid family leave, none of the above laws requires anything more
of employers for a married worker than for an unmarried worker.
There is no national "family" or other wage subsidizing mar-
riage;76 no paid spousal leave (except in California);
77 no compul-
sory health, life, or disability insurance for spouses; 7 and no
mandatory pension, severance, or other retirement that might
yield benefits, even indirectly, to a spouse.79 Indeed, it is a truism
that "employers are under no obligation to provide spousal bene-
fits at all." ° Mandatory contributions to public programs (e.g.,
Social Security, workers' compensation, unemployment compen-
sation) are typically the same for all employees."1 To be sure,
married employees, or retirees, can receive benefits for spouses
note 68, at 1877-78 n.3 (noting percentage of dual-earner married couples); Ann Laquer
Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1388 (2001) (noting "cohabi-
tants are more likely than married couples to have relatively comparable earnings").
73. See, e.g., Civil Service Act, 5 U.S.C. § 6382(a)(1)(C) (2000) (spousal leave); id. §
8109(a)(3)(D) (workers' compensation survivorship); id. § 8416(a)(2) (federal retirement
annuity rights).
74. See Suffredini & Findley, supra note 4, at 602 (noting "important incentives to
marry" from employers).
75. See Kohm, supra note 13, at 582 (observing "[e]mployer encouragement" of mar-
riage is "neither legal nor illegal").
76. See Quigley, supra note 9, at 891-99, 923-24 (noting lack of federal "living" or
family wage, and listing relevant state and local laws, all of which impose a set formula
regardless of marriage or family size).
77. See Michael Gardner, Family Leave Act Effective on July 1, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., June 27, 2004, at A3 (describing California's paid leave system, the first of its kind
in contrast to the unpaid federal system).
78. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983) (commenting that
federal law "does not mandate that employers provide any particular benefits").
79. See id.
80. Jonathan A. Hein, Caring for the Evolving American Family: Cohabiting Partners
and Employer Sponsored Health Care, 30 N.M. L. REV. 19, 24 (2000).
81. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 3111(a) (2000) (indicating wage percentage as Social Security
contribution basis).
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under such programs, and in that sense they are advantaged.
Yet, these benefits are based largely on expectations of depend-
ency, with marriage serving not as their raison d'etre but as a
presumption of such dependency not readily shared, or desired,
by unmarried pairs (both of whom typically work) or singles. 2
Further, such benefits, at least when created, were designed pri-
marily for non-employee spouses of whom the public also expects
reciprocal duties in child-rearing8 3-- duties not yet typical of sin-
gles or unmarried couples. 4
For the most part, then, marriage yields few direct benefits or
rights at work. This is not to say that there are not other areas,
such as family or property law, where greater support exists, but
simply that the workplace is not one. Thus, to the extent such
status is sought by same-sex couples or otherwise, it is perhaps
more for "symbolic meaning[]" 8 --a not inconsequential thing-
than tangible benefit. As Professor Gerard Bradley once observed,
"[miuch of what is truly good in and about marriage is beyond ef-
fective legal assistance." 6 In this sense, and perhaps simply
"[b]ecause marriage . . . [is] part of our affectional and private
lives," concern for marriage at work can largely be said to be more
"a matter for the civil society ... than for the government."" In-
deed, this theme of individual freedom over community duty, al-
though perhaps derived more from a theory of rights than the
subsidiarity norm" proposed by Professor Bradley and others, re-
82. See David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Le-
gal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 474-75 (1996) (noting
that government benefits like Social Security "recognize that one spouse is often economi-
cally dependent on the other," and that "[tihe only couples who consistently benefit from
the current laws are those in which only one partner works in the labor force... [which] is
likely to be the situation more often in opposite-sex than in same-sex couples").
83. See Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 287-88 (1979) (upholding marriage rule for
"mother's" Social Security and citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975),
for notion that, at least in the widow(er) context, benefits are designed to allow spouses
"not to work and to devote themselves to care of children").
84. See, e.g., William C. Duncan, The Social Good of Marriage and Legal Responses to
Non-Marital Cohabitation, 82 OR. L. REV. 1001, 1013 (2003) ("[C]ohabitors desire signifi-
cantly fewer children. .. ").
85. David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call It Marriage". The First Amendment and Marriage
as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 929-30 (2001) (noting role of symbolism
in same-sex marriage debate).
86. Gerard V. Bradley, Same-Sex Marriage: Our Final Answer?, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 729, 731 (2000).
87. BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE 192 (1996).
88. The principle of "subsidiarity" is "the notion that social problems should be ad-
dressed in the first instance by families and other nongovernmental institutions, before
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flects a paradigm shift from the community to the individual in
family law generally. 9 Yet, as explored below, whatever its mer-
its elsewhere, because work is largely a personal task, the rela-
tive lack of family perspective in this arena may not be as conse-
quential as one might think.
II. WEDLOCK AT WORK: ORIGINS AND HISTORY
In the famous 1888 case of Maynard v. Hill,
9 ° where the Su-
preme Court affirmed the right of the sovereign state to define
and regulate marriage (including its dissolution), the Court
opined that marriage "is an institution, in the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there
would be neither civilization nor progress."
9' This emphasis on
the public dimension of marriage dominated the formation of
American law and, in fact, still prevails in large part today.
92
There is certainly an impassioned debate on the primacy of this
public interest in marriage, with some arguing that marriage is a
creation of the state93 and others positing that the state is merely
recognizing a pre-existing bond.94 No matter which end (or mid-
point) of the spectrum is correct, however, all sides in the debate
seem to have always recognized the legitimate role for govern-
ment in marriage. 95
In reviewing the public role in marriage, numerous interests
have been articulated. Among these are ordered procreation and
resort to governmental entities." Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization
of Poverty Programb, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739, 1747 (2002).
89. See GLENDON, supra note 23, at 295 (noting recent shift from community to indi-
vidual in marriage law).
90. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
91. Id. at 211.
92. See DiFonzo, supra note 45, at 34-43 (describing the enduring importance of the
state role in marriage).
93. See, e.g., Baehr, 852 P.2d at 58 (emphasizing "the state's role"); Goodridge, 798
N.E.2d at 954 ("[Tlhe government creates civil marriage.").
94. See, e.g., William C. Duncan, The State Interests in Marriage, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV.
153, 175 (2004) (noting that "male-female couplings... predate[] the concept of civil mar-
riage"); GLENDON, supra note 23, at 5 (asserting that historically, "[flamilies and marriage
are pre-legal institutions").
95. See F. H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 561, 591 (2001) ("[AIll sides in the debate .. .[accept] that the state
has a reasonable role to play. .. ").
2006]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
child rearing," relationship "stability" (for the couple and fam-
ily),97 security for children and spouses,98 mental or physical
health,99 increased regularity in property relations,' 0 "civic virtue
and public morality,"' and, at least historically, "our very exis-
tence and survival."0 2 Traditionally, marriage has "been singled
out ... for preferred status because [it is] so important and valu-
able to society and to the stability and continuity of the state, and
to achieving the purposes for which the state exists."0 3 As noted
above, these interests are reflected in many legal provisions. For
example, paternity and custody presumptions foster order in pro-
creation and child support, 0 4 spousal rights of support and mu-
tual representation foster partner stability,' ° public benefit and
tax rules help ensure financial security of dependents,0 6 and
marital entry rules (e.g., age, sanguinity) naturally advance state
visions of virtue and morality.10 7 Of course, each of these specific
legal provisions also combine to encourage the more generally ac-
knowledged benefits of marriage (e.g., health, happiness, secu-
96. See Duncan, supra note 94, at 154-59 (explaining that procreation and childrear-
ing are critical areas of state interest in laws on marriage).
97. Mark Strasser, Natural Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 74
(1998).
98. See Lynn D. Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish": Considering Same-Sex Marriage in
Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 771, 779-80
(2001) (emphasizing historic state interest in "protecting those who undertake the most
vulnerable family roles for the benefit of society").
99. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 5, at 47-77 (describing physical and mental
benefits of marriage).
100. See Gary Chartier, Natural Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and the Politics of Virtue,
48 UCLA L. REV. 1593, 1620 (2001) (noting the property interests reflected in marital
regulation and recognition).
101. Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Re-
treat from Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 735, 754 (1998).
102. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
103. Wardle, supra note 101, at 754 (commenting on traditional "heterosexual mar-
riages").
104. See Duncan, supra note 94, at 168 (noting paternity law's interest in marital rear-
ing of children).
105. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE
FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 142-43 (2002) (describing laws that serve the "emotional and per-
sonal interconnection" of married, and, at least arguably in Vermont, civil union couples).
106. See Chambers, supra note 82, at 474 ("[Tlaxing and benefit regulations... build
on the expectation that married couples will share resources and recognize that one
spouse is often economically dependent.. ").




rity, and, for that matter, existence), as well as to increase the
symbolic strength of the institution.
1 08
Public support for marriage, and even the debate surrounding
the concept and its meaning, is not new. Indeed, throughout
Western history, "societies have given unique and special prefer-
ence" to marriage because of its oft-perceived benefits, both to
"society in general and for individual women, men, and children
in particular.""0 9 From Aristotle (384-321 B.C.), who saw it "as
the foundation of the republic,""0 to the declaration by Congress
in 1996 that "[mlarriage is the foundation of a successful soci-
ety,""' support for marriage has been constant. As far as Ameri-
can policy is concerned, such support has been strong from the
start. As such, "colonial law, like its English parent, highlighted
the civic or public nature of the marriage pact."
2 And, in this
fashion, "public structuring of marriage during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries served important government pur-
poses." 3 A relative shift occurred in "the twentieth century
[when marriage came to be] defined primarily in economic
terms.""4 And yet, once again, despite this dynamic change in fo-
cus from the community and its public values to the rights of the
individual and private economics, "[tihe position of legal marriage
[whether in the law or culture] above comparable relationships
resist[ed] toppling."" 5 As one family law scholar has noted, de-
spite changes in our culture and history, the "[ciourts have con-
sistently held that marriage is a fundamental constitutional right
that must be afforded to all Americans, 'stemming from pre-Bill
of Rights' values upon which our nation is 'based.""'
6
108. See Chambers, supra note 82, at 450 (noting importance of marriage "symbolism").
109. Wardle, supra note 98, at 777 (commenting on "heterosexual marriage").
110. John Witte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019,
1023 (2001).
111. Corr, supra note 5, at 222 (quoting Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu-
nity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101(1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2110 (the
welfare reform law signed by President Clinton in 1996)).
112. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 19 (1985).
113. Ann Laquer Estin, Marriage and Belonging, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1690, 1699 (2002).
114. Id. at 1705.
115. Corr, supra note 5, at 224-25; see also Kohm, supra note 25, at 328 (noting that,
despite developments in the twentieth century, "'lasting marriage is the goal and ... re-
mains the norm'") (quoting HARRY D. KRAUSE FAMILY LAW 18-19 (1992)).
116. Kohm, supra note 43, at 453 (quoting Lynne Marie Kohm & Mary A. Yarhouse,
Fairness, Accuracy, and Honesty in Discussing Homosexuality and Mariage, 14 REGENT U.
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In light of this history of unwavering public support generally,
one would expect a similar trend in the workplace. Perhaps due
to a general approach of subsidiarity or, more likely, the size and
diversity of a growing nation that left marital support largely to
communities and families themselves,117 work-related benefits did
not appear on any large scale until the 1930s."' There were pro-
grams for spouses of Civil War veterans, but no programs for
workers generally." 9 Indeed, before 1935, benefits from any
source (now arguably the main form of voluntary "marriage sup-
port" at work and supplying, on average, twenty to thirty percent
of compensation) 2 ' could rightly be described as "the fringe of
employee compensation."' Thus, it could be argued that mar-
riage was not necessarily excluded specifically, but as the natural
result of a more general laissez-faire approach to such employee
benefits, and, for that matter, most workplace rights before the
New Deal.
When public support in the workplace did arrive, it did not
come in the form of direct marriage rights, but largely by way of
indirect public benefit and tax incentives, which, generally speak-
ing, were "designed for families with an employed husband and a
homemaker wife" with children' 22-the typical family form at the
time.'23 On the federal level, the relevant marriage "aid" in the
years surrounding World War II included spousal and survivor
Social Security and related Medicare benefits,'24 favorable tax
L. REV. 249, 254 (2002)).
117. See Cor, supra note 5, at 29 ("In the early United States, ... where the popula-
tion spread out thinly under little state surveillance, the state apparatus was not likely to
enter the life of a couple. .. ").
118. See id. at 174 ("New Deal policy innovations revivified the fading connection be-
tween citizenship and marital role through economic avenues.").
119. See Ooms, supra note 34, at 169 (describing Civil War programs for disabled sol-
diers and widows).
120. See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to Incoherence: Congress, Economics,
and Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REV. 685, 691 n. 11 (2002) (citing estimates of 18.7% to 29% of com-
pensation in benefits form).
121. Hein, supra note 80, at 26 (citing, inter alia, 1940s War Labor Board data).
122. Id. at 22; see also COTT, supra note 5, at 172 (noting post-Depression emphasis on
traditional family).
123. See June O'Neill, Keynote Address: Marriage Penalties and Bonuses in the Federal
Income Tax, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 119, 120 (1999) (noting that "two earner couples
were rare" prior to World War II).
124. See Goodwin Liu, Social Security and the Treatment of Marriage: Spousal Bene-
fits, Earnings Sharing, and the Challenge of Reform, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (describ-




treatment for employer-provided health coverage,
12 and, at least
indirectly, special tax treatment for married couples as such.
126 As
noted above, these public incentives and benefits, although
"funded" chiefly by work-based contributions in the case of Social
Security or based largely on employment income in the case of in-
come tax, were created "for the general welfare,"
1 27 rather than as
vested benefits,12 whether for the married or single.
On the state and local levels, the "support" for marriage that
presently exists in the workplace, albeit minor, historically arose
through early twentieth-century income and benefit tax incen-
tives similar to the federal code'
29 --benefit measures such as sur-
vivor workers' compensation 3
0 and unemployment compensation
rights,13' and, of more recent vintage, arguable protection from
discrimination. 3 2 In general, the former provisions, such as tax,
workers' compensation, and unemployment, were designed in ac-
cord with various policies of mutual economic support and pre-
sumptive spousal and child dependency, with emphasis on the
"male breadwinner" model,1 33 while the latter non-discrimination
provisions reflected more of a concern for individual choice, par-
125. See Jeffrey Ralph Pettit, Help! We've Fallen and We Can't Get Up: The Problems
Families Face Because of Employment-Based Health Insurance, 46 VAND. L. REV. 779, 784
(1993) (discussing rise of tax incentives for both employers and employees and 
noting cor-
responding role of collective bargaining).
126. See Cain, supra note 6, at 469-74 (describing marriage-based tax treatment 
of in-
come and benefits).
127. STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: INCOME SECURITY 
167 (Robert B.
Stevens ed., Chelsea House 1970) (quoting Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 
49 Stat.
620).
128. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960) (describing non-contract 
nature
of Social Security).
129. See Chambers, supra note 82, at 472 (noting role of marriage under "state 
income
tax laws").
130. See Joan T.A. Gabel, Escalating Inefficiency in Workers' Compensation Systems: 
Is
Federal Reform the Answer?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1086-87 (1999) (describing
origins of workers' compensation).
131. See Richards v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 420 A.2d 391, 394-95 
(Pa.
1980) (noting role of "economic necessity" in justifying unemployment benefits for 
spouses
unavailable for work due to marital move).
132. See John C. Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A 
Proposal
for the Protection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1415, 1417 (1991) (pointing 
out
that state law protections from "marital status discrimination" began "in the mid 
to late
1970s").
133. See, e.g., Tomarchio v. Twp. of Greenwich, 379 A.2d 848, 854-55 (N.J. 
1977) (dis-
cussing presumptions of economic dependency in the workers' compensation system, 
as
interpreted by the court).
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ticularly for the female worker, rather than family dependency or
other support of marriage as such. 134
Apart from the foregoing, there is no history of other, more sig-
nificant, marriage support on the job, such as increased wages,
mandatory benefits, paid leave, or, at least in federal law, non-
discrimination." 5 Indeed, the only direct federal protection-
unpaid job leave-was not even passed until 1993,136 and even
this law, according to the Supreme Court, is based more on a pub-
lic policy interest in accommodating working mothers, who are
not necessarily married, rather than supporting marriage as
such.'37 In effect, other than indirect Social Security and tax in-
centives if applicable, and benefits it might offer to public em-
ployees directly, no other marriage protections have been histori-
cally mandated (nor, other than unpaid leave, are they now) by
federal law. 3 ' Moreover, on the state and local levels, many of the
protections that actually have come to exist can properly be de-
scribed as quixotic, lacking any cohesive vision. 139 It is certainly
true that the states have done more for marriage than the federal
government, at least historically, but even their efforts, at least
when it comes to the workplace, have been less than consistent or
comprehensive.
In considering this history of marriage at work, one might con-
sider that "m]any laws related to the economic sharing presumed
to be inherent in marriage are premised, in part, upon the tradi-
tional division of labor between husbands and wives" for the
benefit of a family. 4 ° Thus, it makes some sense that apart from
indirect Social Security and tax incentives, which reflect this
model, the workplace has never been a primary source of mar-
riage rights given that most employment laws concern only the
134. See Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604, 610 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[Tjhe primary pur-
pose [of marital status discrimination laws] . . is to prevent discrimination against mar-
ried women....").
135. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 55, at 24 ("It is clear that Congress, in enacting Title
VII [in 19641, did not feel it was necessary to protect the classification of marital status.").
136. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (2000).
137. See Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) ("The FMLA
aims to protect the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace.").
138. See Hein, supra note 80, at 24 (noting that employers have "no obligation to pro-
vide spousal benefits at all").
139. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 55, at 16, 34 (describing "confusion" in state "marital
status" laws).
140. Collett, supra note 7, at 385.
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individual worker.14 ' In any event, the reality of the limited bene-
fits or rights that do exist is significant, both for what they in-
clude and what they do not. Indeed, as the survey of current law
provided below shows, this historical trend of leaving marital pro-
tection largely to private choice and the individual continues un-
der the modern employment law regimes of federal, state, and lo-
cal authority, notwithstanding their possible regulatory
expansion in other respects.
III. CONTEMPORARY LAW: A PRIVATE AFFAIR?
Having surveyed the roots of marriage in law and culture gen-
erally, the next step in the study of marital rights on the job is to
examine specifically the contemporary law on the matter. As
noted above, federal law is largely limited to indirect, and often
unused, public Social Security and tax incentives and private un-
paid leave, and on the state or local side, fairly minor public bene-
fits (e.g., workers' compensation and unemployment) and private
rights (e.g., non-discrimination). Of course, such generalities are
insufficient to understand the full landscape, and thus the mod-
ern marriage debate in context, as noted at the start of this arti-
cle. Therefore, let us proceed to analyze each of these rights and
benefits, in both their substance and their theoretical bases, to
understand better this area of law and its implications for both
marriage and employment.
A. Federal Rights and Benefits
As noted above, the federal rights and benefits that arguably
support marriage in the workplace, directly or indirectly, are: (1)
unpaid family leave;' 42 (2) limited pension and health plan protec-
tions;'43 (3) Social Security and Medicare benefits;'
44 (4) income
141. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 574 (2001)
(explaining individual and employment law).
142. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000) (listing leave
entitlements).
143. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)
(2000) (explaining spousal rights under joint and survivor annuity option).
144. See, e.g., Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (c) (2000) (regarding
spousal Social Security).
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taxation credits, deductions, and incentives; 145 and (5) civil ser-
vant benefits, 4 6 at least to the extent they reflect a federal policy
of support for marriage for givernment workers.
1. Family and Medical Leave
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (the "FMLA") be-
came law after a long legislative journey that began in 1985, and
in states before that.'47 The FMLA requires covered employers
(generally, public agencies or private employers with fifty or more
workers) 14 to give covered employees (generally, those who have
worked at least 1250 hours in the past year) 49 up to twelve weeks
unpaid leave per year for the birth or adoption of a child, a par-
ent's, child's, or personal "serious health condition," or, most rele-
vant for our purposes, "to care for [a] spouse" who "has a serious
health condition." 5 ° Although this spousal leave provision is
clearly part of the FMLA, there is little legislative history on it;
instead, the primary emphasis in the FMLA's passage was on
other leave provisions, such as for the birth of a child or one's own
health because it is not so limited to pregnancy.' 5' Indeed, no-
where in its "findings" and "purposes" does Congress comment on
spousal leave.152 Instead, the focus is squarely on "parents," "fa-
thers," "mothers," and "employees," with no mention of spouses or
couples at all.'53 To be sure, spousal leave is within the FMLA's
concept of "family caretaking," but the Act's stated purpose and
the leave provisions themselves overwhelmingly subordinate
marriage to the care of sick children or the individual employee at
issue. 5 4
145. See generally Cain, supra note 6, at 466 (discussing general tax consequences of
marriage).
146. See, e.g., Civil Service Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8416(a)(2) (2000) (explaining spousal retire-
ment annuity rights).
147. See Emily A. Hayes, Note, Bridging the Gap Between Work and Family: Accom-
plishing the Goals of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1507, 1516-20 (2001).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4) (2000) (defining "employer").
149. Id. § 2611(2) (defining "eligible employee").
150. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(C).
151. See Hayes, supra note 147, at 1508 (noting that the FMLA passed primarily for
"the needs of new mothers").
152. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000) (Congressional findings and purposes of the FMLA).
153. See id. § 2601(a)(2)-(4).
154. See generally id. § 2601 (providing Congress' general family leave approach in the
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When considering the importance, or lack thereof, of spouses
under the FMLA, it is critical to note that, based on the fifty-
employee minimum for coverage, only about fifty-eight percent of
American employees are even covered and eligible under its
terms.5 5 Further, of the covered and eligible, only seventeen per-
cent, on average, need FMLA leave in a given year.5 6 Moreover,
less than six percent of the employees who take leave take it for a
spouse.' 5' This data is illustrated in the following chart:




U.S. Total FMLA Efigible Need FMLA Leave Take Spousal FMLA
N Percentage of Employees
Thus, given these numbers, the annual rate of workers who are
both covered and eligible under the FMLA and who actually need
leave to care for an ill spouse is less than .7%.158
Indeed, apart from even the foregoing, married and unmarried
workers are largely treated the same under the FMLA. All em-
ployees, married or not, can and do obtain FMLA leave for their
FMLA).
155. See Jane Waldfogel, Family and Medical Leave: Evidence from the 2000 Surveys,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 2001, at 17, 19 (indicating 58.3% of American workers were
covered by FMLA in 2000); see also COMM'N ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE
POLICIES 61 (1996) (reporting similar data in 1996).
156. Waldfogel, supra note 155, at 21 tbl.4 (noting 16.5% of FMLA-covered took leave
in 2000).
157. See id. at 20 (noting 5.9% of FMLA leave in 2000 was for spousal care).
158. The estimate (.0066) is from combining percentages of: (1) FMLA eligible and cov-
ered (58%), (2) eligible and covered who need FMLA leave (17%), and (3) eligible and cov-
ered who need FMLA for a spouse (6%). As an aside, it should be noted that married cou-
ples who work for the same employer are also restricted in that they are only allowed
twelve weeks of annual FMLA leave between them. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(f) (2000).
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own illnesses and those of a parent (yet not an in-law) or a
child.'59 One might argue that there is, at least derivatively, a dif-
ference for unmarried employees in that child-based leave does
not typically extend beyond blood or other direct legal relation-
ships.16° Just as in the law of paternity generally, however, the
connection raised by the FMLA for relationships to children is
largely "premised upon [a] biological linkage [to the child] rather
than [a parent's] marital status."16' Thus, perhaps with the minor
exception of a "stepchild,"162 it is not one's marriage to the child's
mother or father that yields this right to job leave under the
FMLA, but rather one's relation to that child.
In sum, the spousal FMLA leave that is both available and
needed is limited. To be sure, it can be a valuable form of job se-
curity in some cases. Yet, even to the extent leave is helpful,
there is still no requirement that it be paid,163 thus further mini-
mizing its allure in a context where it can be assumed that family
budgets are already strained by virtue of the costs and lack of
earnings, if any, of the spouse or partner with the "condition" at
issue." The FMLA may yield many responses, from high praise
to sharp criticism, for its coverage and treatment of leave issues,
but discriminatory treatment based on marital status is simply
not significant fodder for such a debate.
2. ERISA Protections
The dominant law in all of employee benefits is the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"),"65 which was
enacted in response to a series of scandals in the pension arena
that caused major damage to the retirement income of thou-
159. See id. § 2612(a) (setting forth general FMIA leave entitlement provision).
160. See id. § 2611(12) (defining "son or daughter" under the FMLA as "biological,
adopted, or foster child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person standing in loco
parentis"); see also Ryiah Lilith, Caring for the Ten Percent's 2.4: Lesbian and Gay Parents'
Access to Parental Benefits, 16 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 125, 126-27 (2001) (describing "parental
leave" challenges to same-sex couples). Interestingly, the FMIA does not include "in-laws"
in its definition of "parent." See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(7) (2000).
161. Collett, supra note 7, at 395.
162. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(12) (2000).
163. See id. § 2612(c).
164. See Erin Gielow, Note, Equality in the Workplace: Why Family Leave Does Not
Work, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1546-49 (2002) (describing economic pressures of unpaid
leave in childbirth context).
165. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
[Vol. 40:867
LOVE DOESN'T PAY
sands.166 The main thrust of ERISA is to regulate plan adminis-
trators and fiduciaries to safeguard employees from imprudent or
disloyal management of their plan funds or rights and also to en-
force promises made under pension plans as well as so-called
"welfare benefit plans" (e.g., health, life, disability). 167 Although
not its primary focus, ERISA also aims to protect employees from
themselves by regulating certain aspects of their participation in
the relevant plans, including, albeit in a minor way, within their
168marriages.
ERISA considers marriage in three direct, though fairly lim-
ited, ways: (1) annuity pension rules;169 (2) as an exception to its
anti-alienation rule; 7° and (3) continued access to otherwise pro-
vided health-care coverage. 7' First, unless waived by the non-
employee spouse, certain pensions, particularly "defined benefit"
plans (i.e., plans that typically offer fixed benefits based on years
of service, not contributions) must give continued annuity rights
to surviving spouses, while other pensions, such as "defined con-
tribution" plans (i.e., plans based, at least in part, on employee
contributions) must give flat rights of survivorship.172 Second, al-
though ERISA normally bars alienation of pension benefits in a
participant's lifetime, it will recognize a limited transfer under a
"qualified domestic relations order" ("QDRO") issued by a court
for alimony or other support upon a divorce or similar domestic
action.'73 Third, under an amendment to ERISA by the Consoli-
dated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"),
166. See DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker,
J., concurring) ("ERISA was enacted... to address the increasingly-apparent insecurity of
workers' vested pension funds . . ").
167. See Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 107 (1989) ("[The] primary purposeo
[of ERISA is] preventing the mismanagement of accumulated plan funds and the failure to
pay benefits from such funds....").
168. See Hagwood v. Newton, 282 F.3d 285, 291 (4th Cir. 2002) (addressing marital
interests in context of ERISA spousal survivor benefit rights); Lorraine Schmall, Defined
Contribution Plans After Enron, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 891, 921-22 (2003) (noting self-
protective aspects of ERISA's non-alienation provisions).
169. See JOHN F. BUCKLEY, ERISA LAW ANSWER BOOK 14-12 to 14-14 (4th ed. 2003)
(describing relevant spousal rights to annuity payments upon survivorship).
170. See Boggs, 520 U.S. at 848, 851 (describing non-alienation limit in domestic rela-
tions).
171. See 29 U.S.C. § 1167(3) (2000) (including "spouse" as "qualified beneficiary" for
continued coverage).
172. See Leslie A. Klein & Frank P. VanderPloeg, Retirement Equity Act (REA) Work-
shop: Spousal Consents and Other Issues, SK012 ALI-ABA 97, 100-101 (2004) (describing
"general requirements for spousal interests in retirement benefits" under ERISA).
173. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 847-48.
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covered health-care plans, if offered at all, are required to offer
employees, spouses, and dependent children rights to continued
coverage, at employee expense, for temporary periods post-
termination.'74
Turning to the first area of marriage treatment (i.e., pension
annuity rules), under ERISA the relevant requirement is that:
A "qualified joint and survivor annuity" ("QJSA") must be the "de-
fault" form of retirement benefit payment for a married participant
under a... defined benefit pension plan ... or any other plan that
has a benefit option in the form of a life annuity which is elected by
the Participant, unless properly waived by the participant with the
spouse's consent. 175
Thus, unless waived, "the interests of a married plan participant
must be distributed in the form of a QJSA," which is "an annuity
for the life of the participant with a survivor annuity for the life
of his or her spouse" of 50% to 100% of the retiree annuity.' 6 As a
result, though, such retirees "typically receive a lower benefit
during retirement to account for the likely increase in the number
of years that the pension plan will have to make payments."177
With this in mind, "[niot surprisingly, a relatively low percentage
of workers choose to take their benefits in the form of joint and
survivor annuities."'78 Spouses have protection in that their con-
sent is required to waive survivor rights, 79 but given the likeli-
hood of actuarial equivalency, there is no further benefit to the
married (as opposed to unmarried) participant. Rather, it is the
spouse who has the right, and it is only one of structure that typi-
cally does not yield an overall increase in pension funds.
174. See Jarret Tomis Barrios, Growing Pains in the Workplace: Tax Consequences of
Health Plans for Domestic Partners, 47 TAX LAW. 845, 861-62 (1994) (describing COBRA
coverage as marital benefit).
175. Klein & VanderPloeg, supra note 172, at 100 (describing QJSA requirements in
ERISA).
176. BUCKLEY, supra note 169, at 14-12, 14-13. If the employee dies pre-retirement, the
interest must be paid in a "qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity," which differs from
QJSA only in timing. See id. at 14-25.
177. Jonathan Barry Forman, Whose Pension Is It Anyway?: Protecting Spousal Rights
in a Privatized Social Security System, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1667 (1998); see also Ellen E.
Schultz, Widows Lament, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2005, at B1 (describing survivorship dy-
namics in modern pension plans).
178. Forman, supra note 177, at 1667.
179. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2) (2000).
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With regard to defined contribution plans, ERISA generally
requires that, unless waived, assets remaining at death be given
first to a surviving spouse."' Thus, "profit sharing, 401(k), and
other plans not subject (and not wanting to be subject) to the
QJSA/QPSA requirements [must] make a surviving spouse the
'default' beneficiary of [a] participant's entire account balance.
S..181 This certainly provides a specific right to the spouse of a
participant. And yet, again, not only is this right subject to
waiver, it does not actually yield any more benefits, and to a de-
gree, unmarried workers, if not their partners, actually retain
more rights by virtue of their freedom to dispose of such benefits
as they see fit, including bequeathing them by contract or plan
designation.1
2
The second manner in which marriage is relevant under
ERISA is a related, yet more indirect, protection for spouses in
providing certain exceptions to its general rule of "non-alienation"
of pension provisions, which include the QDRO.' 3 In establishing
"[iflorm and payment of benefits" requirements, ERISA mandates
generally that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.""s The
law, however, does afford exceptions to this rule, chief among
them being that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide for the pay-
ment of benefits in accordance with the applicable requirements
of any [QDRO] ."1185 A QDRO is an order that "creates or recognizes
the existence of an alternate payee's right" to plan benefits and
concerns, among other things, "alimony payments, or marital
property rights to a spouse, former spouse ... or other dependent
of a participant," and "is made pursuant to a State domestic rela-
tions law."'86 In so doing, ERISA makes exceptions to non-
180. See Klein & VanderPloeg, supra note 172, at 100-01 (observing that non-annuity
contribution plans are generally exempt from QJSA requirement if the "participant's en-
tire vested benefit is payable in full, on death, to his or her surviving spouse, unless the
surviving spouse consents to the designation of another beneficiary").
181. Id. at 101.
182. See Collett, supra note 7, at 392 ("The availability of private agreements and a
careful analysis of the 'marital benefits' reveal that there are few advantages in further-
ance of economic sharing by married couples that are not available to same-sex couples
through private ordering of their relationships, and the few advantages that cannot be du-
plicated impact remarkably few individuals.").
183. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2000) (setting forth the ERISA non-alienation provision).
184. Id. § 1056(d)(1).
185. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(A).
186. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(B).
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alienation in the domestic relations context, but in a manner
largely dependent on state law. Thus, ERISA adds little to state
rights that otherwise exist."8 7 It is arguable that the federal
DOMA limits extending QDROs (or mandatory QJSAs, for that
matter) to the unmarried context,"' but the inclusion of "other
dependent" in the QDRO statutory language8 9 would certainly
seem to diminish this per se limit, at least in relation to state law,
as would the existing option, if not rule, of alternative beneficiary
arrangements for non-spousal partners. 9 °
Finally, COBRA amended ERISA in 1985 to allow "a qualified
beneficiary" access to "continued coverage under the plan when
he might otherwise lose that benefit [following a qualifying
event], such as the termination of employment."' 9' COBRA is "de-
signed to create a bridge from one employer's health plan to an-
other." 92 There is no requirement that employers pay for "this
bridge," but only that they offer access to the plan by a "qualified
beneficiary" at no more than 102% its cost for up to eighteen
months (or thirty-six in certain circumstances) or access to new
coverage, whichever occurs first.' 93 Under COBRA, a "qualified
beneficiary," however, includes not only the employee, but also a
"spouse" and any "dependent child," while a "qualifying event" in-
cludes not only a job loss, but also death or a "divorce or legal
separation."' 94 Thus, if coverage is offered to spouses, they will
have a continued right to it upon a spouse's job loss or death, or
the end of their marriage. To be sure, this right is extended only
to the legally married,' 95 but there is nothing to bar an employer
187. See Boggs, 520 U.S. at 848 (noting, under the QDRO exception, "Congress ensured
that state domestic relations orders, as long as they meet certain statutory requirements,
are not pre-empted").
188. See Klein & VanderPloeg, supra note 172, at 105 (noting potential impact of the
DOMA on ERISA).
189. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I) (2000).
190. See Klein & VanderPloeg, supra note 172, at 105 ("[Wlhere a plan permits joint-
and-survivor annuities for the lives of a participant and a non-spouse beneficiary, nothing
prevents the plan from offering, or a participant from electing, such benefit for the partici-
pant and his or her [unmarried partner] .... ").
191. Geissal v. Moore Med. Corp., 524 U.S. 74, 76 (1998).
192. RICHARD CARLSON, EMPLOYMENT LAw 318 (2005).
193. See id. at 318-19 (describing COBRA).
194. See 29 U.S.C. § 1167(3) (2000) (stating that a "qualified beneficiary" includes
spouses and dependents); id. § 1163(1)-(3) (stating that death, job termination, and di-
vorce/separation are "qualifying events").
195. See Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Family Law, A White Paper: An Analysis of the Law
Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q.
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that has otherwise shown its willingness to cover unmarried
partners (truly, the only situation where the issue would arise)
from offering similar continuation rights. Again, ERISA is more
about protecting than creating expectations. There is no guaran-
tee, but the practical reality, including that most unmarried
partners are each already covered by their own insurance,
196 leads
one to conclude that the marriage difference is not that great.
As noted in Part I, "employers are under no obligation to pro-
vide spousal benefits at all" under ERISA.'97 And, apart from the
rights just described, even when benefits are offered, "ERISA
does not confer beneficiary status on nonparticipants by reason of
their marital .. .status."9 8 Further, although they offer some
protection, QJSA/QPSA rights typically are paid for by the cou-
ple,199 the QDRO merely reflects a balance of pension protection
with state domestic rights, 00 and COBRA simply enforces the
status quo.2 ' Individual employers may provide other beneficiary
rights and benefits, but ERISA does not require them, regardless
of the nature of the marriage or relationship at issue.
3. Social Security and Medicare Benefits
The precursors of Social Security are many, from the "Poor
Laws" of seventeenth century England,0 2 to eighteenth century
writings of Thomas Paine,"0 3 to the nineteenth century ideals of
339, 367, 369 (2004) (listing COBRA among rights "automatically accorded to married
spouses").
196. See Collett, supra note 7, at 388-89 (positing little benefit in extending health care
to same-sex couples).
197. Hein, supra note 80, at 24; see also CARLSON, supra note 192, at 319 (noting
"[n]either COBRA nor ERISA requires an employer to establish or maintain a health plan
for its employees").
198. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 847.
199. See Forman, supra note 177, at 1667-68 (regarding QJSA funding).
200. See Boggs, 520 U.S. at 848 (observing that by its QDRO limit to non-alienation,
Congress recognized that "[a]s a general matter, '[tihe whole subject of the domestic rela-
tions of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to
the laws of the United States'") (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)).
201. See Lutheran Hosp. of Ind., Inc. v. Bus. Men's Assurance Co. of Am., 51 F.3d 1308,
1313 (7th Cir. 1995) (asserting purpose of COBRA as "[pireservation of the status quo").
202. See Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income and the
Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063,
1079 (1997) (commenting on the influence of "English Poor Laws" on our modem Social
Security system).
203. See Larry DeWitt, Historical Background and Development of Social Security: Old
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the Catholic Church (particularly, Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Re-
rum Novarum of 1891)204 and Germany under Bismarck, °5 to
name a few. These roots took hold in America on a small scale
with pensions for Civil War veterans2 °6 and culminated on a
grand scale with the New Deal passage of the Social Security Act
of 1935.207 Often called the untouchable "third rail" of politics,20 8
the system was based "on the theory that 'American Citizens had
a right to protection against distress caused by economic condi-
tions beyond their control.'"2"9 As Supreme Court Justice Cardozo
wrote shortly after its passage, "[t]he hope behind [the Social Se-
curity Act] is to save men and women from the rigors of the poor
house as well as from the haunting fear that such a lot awaits
them when journey's end is near."210 The original system offered
basic retirement levels, while hospital coverage was added in
1965 under a related program called Medicare.21
i. Benefits and Funding
Although loosely designed as an investment and return system
funded by work-based contributions, as opposed to a needs-based
welfare program, the funding and payout functions operate inde-
Age in Colonial America, Social Security Online (noting the role of Thomas Paine's pam-
phlet Agrarian Justice, which advocated, among other things, a public old-age support sys-
tem), available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2006).
204. See Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum [On the Condition of the Working Classes]
79 (St. Paul, ed., Pauline Books & Media 1995) (1891) (arguing, at least in labor union con-
text, that funds should be set aside to "furnish the means of assisting individual members
in need.., whenever anyone is stricken... by old age, or by misfortune").
205. Mary Ann Glendon, Discovering Our Dependence, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2004, at 12
(commenting on Otto von Bismarck's establishment of "the world's first social securi'ty sys-
tem").
206. See Dilley, supra note 202, at 1086 (citing the "Civil War pension system" as a
"root[]" of the current system).
207. See id. (tracing the historical development of the Social Security Act of 1935).
208. Michael Kranish, Bush, Kerry Remain Vague on Social Security, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 15, 2004, at A25 ("Social Security is known as the 'third rail' of politics [sic] touch it
and you die.").
209. Matthew H. Hawes, So No Damn Politician Can Ever Scrap It: The Constitutional
Protection of Social Security Benefits, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 865, 901 (2004) (quoting J. Doug-
las Brown, Philosophical Basis of the National Old Age Insurance Program, in SOCIAL SE-
CURITY AND PRIVATE PENSION PLANS: COMPETITIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY? 1, 3 (Dan M.
McGill ed., 1977)).
210. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937).
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 426 (a)-(b) (2000) (offering basic Medicare eligibility in concert
with Social Security Act).
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pendently. Thus, "each worker's benefits, though flowing from the
contributions he made to the national economy while actively
employed, are not dependent on the degree to which he . .. sup-
port[ed] the system by taxation."2 12 To be sure, the pension sys-
tem is funded by a payroll tax on work, and benefits are paid out
based on minimum years in the labor force and one's earnings.
But, as the Supreme Court has made clear, the link between in-
put and output is a systemic, rather than individual, one. 213 Thus,
it is a "'pay-as-you-go' system" under which "current workers con-
tribute FICA/payroll taxes that go directly to fund benefits to cur-
rent retirees and other beneficiaries," and "[wihen today's work-
ers reach retirement, they in turn will expect tomorrow's workers
to contribute taxes sufficient to fund their promised benefits."
2 4
In providing this "intergenerational" benefit,21 5 the program,
although funded by workers and their employers, and based on
worker eligibility, does not limit its benefits to workers.21 6 Rather,
it includes among its beneficiaries certain dependents of eligible
retirees, including children and, more importantly for our present
purpose, spouses-both current and surviving, and, in some
cases, divorced.21 '7 Although now paid on a gender-neutral basis
(i.e., to spouses of either sex), these "social insurance" benefits
were based, at least at their inception, on the "presumption that a
man is responsible for the support of his wife and children."
21 Of
course, the various spousal benefits can also be justified in terms
of worker-based incentives, not only for the care of children (i.e., a
"non-working" spouse's presumed work), but also to support a
population-based system where children cared for today are ex-
pected to fund benefits as workers of tomorrow (i.e., by future
work).219 In any event, whether implicitly or explicitly, there is no
212. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1960).
213. See id. at 610 (noting systemic nature of the Social Security system).
214. Hon. Rick Santorum, Wealth Creation in the New Millenium: Transforming Pov-
erty in America, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 383, 388 (2002).
215. Id.
216. See Forman, supra note 69, at 935 (noting "redistribution" in Social Security taxes
and payouts).
217. See Forman, supra note 177, at 1656-58 (describing family Social Security bene-
fits).
218. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 644 (1975) (citing relevant Social Security
legislative history).
219. See Glendon, supra note 205, at 11 (noting the need for future laborers for Social
Security system and what Cambridge economist Partha Dasgupta calls the "free rider'
problem" of "childless individuals").
20061
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
doubt dependency and reward are rational qualifiers for benefits
under the system-qualifiers that take on greater importance
than ever when, as now, the system faces growing financial chal-
lenges that, even from the most optimistic viewpoint, seem to re-
quire contraction over expansion.22 °
With regard to funding, "Social Security levies a flat-rate pay-
roll tax on all [of a worker's] employment earnings up to a speci-
fied maximum."221 No further contribution is required based on
marital status or dependents-i.e., only work is taxed, and it is
taxed equally.222 Thus, it is true that the benefits that spouses or
dependents receive from the system as such are not necessarily
funded directly by their own taxes, but rather by those of their
worker spouses or, frankly, others.223 Of course, the contributions
that spouses make by supporting a wage-earning spouse and
children are recognized, at least implicitly, when it comes to bene-
fits, 224 although the benefit amounts reflecting such recognition
might not be enough to outweigh one's desire, and right, to also
engage in paid work.
Spousal pension benefits derive largely from the wage-earner
spouse's insurance amount.2 ' 5 This amount, calculated after meet-
ing a threshold requirement of ten years in the workforce, is
"based on a worker's past earnings" as follows:
[B]enefits are calculated by first determining average indexed
monthly earnings (AIME), which represents the present value of a
worker's average monthly wage (up to a specified maximum) during
the thirty-five years in which he or she earned the most. The AIME
is then used to determine the primary insurance amount (PIA),
220. See Kranish, supra note 208 (positing that Social Security "is on the road to bank-
ruptcy").
221. Liu, supra note 124, at 10. For 2005, the pension tax rate is 12.4% on earnings to
$90,000, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 430 (West Supp. 2005), and is split between employer and em-
ployee (6.2% each), see 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a) (2000). The Medicare tax rate is 2.9%
on all earnings (with no cap), also split between employer and employee (1.45% each). See
id. §§ 3101(b), 3111(b).
222. See Forman, supra note 69, at 935-36 (noting taxing of only "individual workers
based on their individual earnings," while paying out benefits both "to workers and their
[spouses/dependents]," if they have them).
223. See id. (noting redistribution effect of Social Security taxation and benefits).
224. See Jane Maslow Cohen, Competitive and Cooperative Dependencies: The Case for
Children, 81 VA. L. REv. 2217, 2237-38 (1995) (noting recognition of "non-cash contribu-
tions to welfare" by spouses).




which is the basic monthly amount a person would receive if he or
she retired and began to collect benefits at the normal retirement
age. The PIA is calculated by applying to the AIME a formula involv-
ing three brackets with decreasing benefit 
rates. 2 26
A spousal benefit is then determined for those "at normal retire-
ment age" who have been married for at least one year (or have
children with the spouse), with a "dual entitlement rule" that
provides the spouse "is entitled to the greater of (1) the PIA based
on his or her own AIME, or (2) fifty percent of the PIA based on
the AIME of his or her spouse."27 In the event of divorce or death,
a divorcee can receive "the spousal benefit, but only if the mar-
riage lasted at least ten years and that divorced spouse was not
married at the time of first eligibility for benefits," and a
widow(er) can receive up to "a monthly surviving spouse benefit
equal to 100% of the [deceased] worker's PIA,"
22' both with the
"dual entitlement rule" (i.e., one can only receive the larger of
one's own benefit or the spousal benefit) still in effect.
229 In the
event of disability, the 50%-spousal (or, later, 100%-survivor)
benefit is also available (with the "dual entitlement rule") for
older spouses (age sixty-two) or those with minor or disabled chil-
dren.23 °
As far as Medicare is concerned, "[a] person entitled to Social
Security .. .is automatically entitled to hospital insurance" at
age sixty-five (also known as "Medicare Part A").
231 This eligibility
applies regardless of the basis for Social Security, and, thus, it in-
cludes retirees and all spouse types (i.e., spouse, divorcee, survi-
226. Liu, supra note 124, at 11. In 2006, the monthly benefit at normal retirement (i.e.,
sixty-five to sixty-seven years old, see 42 U.S.C. § 416(1) (2000)), is "the sum of: (a) 90% of
the first $656 of [AIME], plus (b) 32% of [AIME] over $656 and through $3,955, plus (c)
15% of [AIME] over $3,955," Primary Insurance Amount, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE,
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/piaformula.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006), up to $1,939,
2005 Social Security Changes, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/
factsheets/colafacts2005.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). Participants can also retire be-
fore or after normal retirement age, with their benefits generally adjusted (down or up)
accordingly. See NAT'L ORG. OF SOC. SEC. CLAIMANTS' REPRESENTATIVES, 1 SOCIAL
SECURITY PRACTICE GUIDE 4-26 to 4-30 (2005) [hereinafter CLAIMANTS'
REPRESENTATIVES].
227. Liu, supra note 124, at 12. One-year marriage or parentage are common methods
for spouse coverage, although other routes (e.g., pre-existing coverage, widowhood) do ex-
ist. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(b) (2000).
228. Forman, supra note 69, at 925.
229. See id. at 925-26 (describing "dual entitlement rule" in divorce/survivor context).
230. See CLAIMANTS' REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 226, at 7-9 to 7-10.
231. HARVEY L. MCCORMICK, 1 MEDICARE AND MEDICAID CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES §
1:13 (3d ed. 2001).
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vor),232 and extends benefits regardless of a retiree's earnings re-
cord or that of a spouse.233 The benefits generally include hospital,
skilled nursing, home health, and hospice care.234 Further bene-
fits (e.g., physician care, outpatient services, prescription drugs)
are obtained from the other parts of Medicare (i.e., "Medicare
Part B"),235 but such benefits are available (and generally at a
premium) regardless of Social Security eligibility.236
ii. Practical and Theoretical Implications
Based on the foregoing, marriage can yield a 50%-spousal or a
100%-survivor benefit, unless more is obtained by one's own
work, and there is no doubt this benefit is not enjoyed by the un-
married. Further, by virtue of Social Security eligibility, spouses
can also receive Medicare Part A. Yet, as noted in Part I above,
there are several factors that limit this apparent preference for
marriage. First, given the "dual entitlement rule," both the expec-
tation at the benefits' creation and the nature of modern mar-
riage point to a "relatively small"237 amount due to the increase of
dual-income households (a reality shared by the unmarried).2 1
Second, the benefits at issue are rooted in a theory of "presump-
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 426 (a)(2)(A) (2000) (referencing one's eligibility for retirement un-
der the Social Security Act, which includes spouse coverage, as criterion for Medicare Part
A eligibility).
233. See Catherine V. Kilgore, Health Care and Social Security Update-2001, 70
MIss. L.J. 1007, 1007 (2001) (noting Medicare "is available . . . regardless of financial
status"). Thus, to the extent such benefits are based on simple Social Security eligibility
(i.e., ten years of work) and not earnings, the only distinction between married and un-
married would lie for those with no significant work history at all-a rather rare state for
the unmarried and one which, presumably, would otherwise give rise to welfare-based
coverage under Medicaid, a comparable program for the indigent. See 2 MCCORMICK, su-
pra note 231, § 21:16.
234. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 231, § 1:21 (discussing Medicare Part A benefits).
235. See id. § 1:28 (discussing Medicare Part B benefits).
236. See id. §§ 1:22 to 1:27 (discussing individuals covered under Medicare Part B).
237. SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, A REPORT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD TO THE
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (1938) [hereinafter, 1938 SSB
REPORT] (on file with author), available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/38ssbadvise.
html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
238. See Liu, supra note 124, at 2-3 (noting limited Social Security benefits to dual-
income married couples, which describes most couples); see also Collett, supra note 7, at
386 (noting in same-sex context, "[biased upon the limited research available, same-sex
couples likely to marry will continue to pursue two careers") (citing M.V. Lee Badgett &
Josh A. Goldfoot, For Richer, For Poorer: The Freedom to Marry Debate, ANGLES, May
1996, at 1, 3, available at http://www.iglss.org/pubs/angles arc.html (last visited _)).
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tive need" or dependence on one worker, 23
9 not marriage per se (a
presumption not shared by the unmarried), further limiting any
notion of an unqualified endorsement of relationship form.
24 °
Third, at least in comparison to other forms, although alternative
parenting is increasing, the "family" (i.e., child) aspect of the
benefit 24 1 offers a cycle of incentive and reward for 
child-rearing24 2
that is, at least presently, performed mainly in the traditional
husband-wife setting (even if there was a divorce).
243
First, to the extent benefits are offered to spouses, it should be
noted that, at least practically, their number is not large, and, if
anything, is decreasing-often to the distress of progressives and
traditionalists alike.2" Again, one premise at the benefits' crea-
tion was in "time many women will have developed substantial
benefit rights based upon their own past earnings," and, thus,
eventually would cost "a relatively small amount."
245 For the most
part, this has proven true as follows: (1) 5% of Social Security re-
cipients (3% of all benefits) are paid on a spousal retirement basis
only 46 (down from 16% and 10%, respectively, in 1960),247 (2) 10%
of recipients (less than 10% of benefits) are paid on a spousal sur-
239. See 1938 SSB REPORT, supra note 237 (predicting in 1938 that "the cost of provid-
ing the supplement for dependent wives would gradually decline" given rise of working
women and the "dual entitlement rule").
240. Cf. Knauer, supra note 32, at 155-56 (noting that presumptions of "economicn in-
terdependen[cel" are not common in private domestic partnership policies or local 
ordi-
nances, most of which require "proof).
241. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975) (noting that the provision
of spousal benefits in the 1939 Social Security amendments was "one of a large number 
of
amendments designed to 'afford more adequate protection to the family as a unit'") (citing
H.R. REP. No. 76-728, at 7 (1939)).
242. See CoTT, supra note 5, at 177 (arguing Social Security encourages "stay-at-home
wives and mothers").
243. See Unmarried Childbearing, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS 
(esti-
mating the percentage of unmarried births in 2003 at 34.6%), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
fastats/unmarry.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
244. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institu-
tional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2059-64 (1996) (summarizing range 
of critiques of
Social Security).
245. 1938 SSB REPORT, supra note 237.
246. See OASDI Monthly Statistics, June 2005, SOC. SEC. ONLINE, tbl.1 (listing OASDI
benefits by program and type of benefit, June 2004-June 2005), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/
docs/statcomps/oasdi-monthlyl2006-01/table0l.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2006); 
id. tbl.2




247. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY




UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
vivor basis, and (3) less than 1% of recipients or benefits are
paid on a disabled spouse basis.24 9 Of those receiving benefits
both by their own work and by marriage (42% of women; 1% of
men):250 (1) 6% of are paid on a retirement basis, (2) 6% are paid
on a survivor basis, and (3) less than 1% are paid on a disabled
basis. 251 The relevant data is illustrated as follows:






All Benefits Retiree Benefits Disability Survivor
Benefits Benefits
E Percentage of all recipients
E Percentage of spousal-only recipients
o Percentage of dually-entitled recipients
With regard to individual benefits, "spousal only" recipients, as
noted above, receive one-half of their spouses' amount (plus Medi-
care), while, on average, the "dually entitled" yield a marriage-
based benefit that is only about one-third of their given retiree
benefit 25 2 or one-half of their given survivor benefit 2 3 (and, by its
248. See SOC. SEC. ONLINE, supra note 246, at tbl.1; id. at tbl. 4 (listing all OASI survi-
sors benefits, by type of beneficiary, June 2004-June 2005), http'//www.ssa.gov/policy/
docs/statcomps/oasdi-monthy/2006-01/tableO4.html) (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). Interest-
ingly, with respect to same-sex pairs, it is doubtful there would be much survivor benefit
since they "are usually about the same age and have a similar life expectancy." Frank S.
Berall, Tax Consequences of Unmarried Cohabitation, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 395, 398
(2004).
249. See SOC. SEC. ONLINE, supra note 246, at tbl.1; id. at tbl.5 (listing all DI benefits,
by type of beneficiary, June 2004-June 2005), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/
oasdi.monthly/2006-01/tableO5.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
250. See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 247, at tbl.5.G3 (providing data on dually enti-
tled, December 2002).
251. Compare id. at tbl.5.A1 (all recipients, December 2005), with id. at tbl.5.G3 (dually
entitled, December 2002). There is no data on disabled spouses, yet they are likely mini-
mal given figures for such benefits generally.
252. See id. at tbl.5.G3 (listing average combined and reduced secondary spouse bene-
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nature, no further Medicare). 4 In fact, in light of recent propos-
als to convert part of Social Security to a private account system,
it is likely that such benefits may see even further reductions in
the future.255
The foregoing data suggests that spousal benefits are increas-
ingly unused; this is, of course, due primarily to the role of the
"dual entitlement rule" in modern couples, which, shown by this
data alone, are increasingly dual-income. Moreover, there is no
question that most unmarried pairs, given their independent na-
ture, would face a similar fate." 6 Thus, at least practically, it is
economic choice, not marriage, that plays the greater role. In fact,
rather than a benefit, some have argued quite persuasively that
the system actually undermines marriage, at least in its modern
form. This argument asserts that the "dual entitlement rule"
harms low-income spouses, largely women, whose contributions
are left unrecognized if they yield a benefit less than half their
partner's.257 It also posits that the system undervalues domestic
work, particularly for spouses who rely on lower-income workers,
are divorced before the required ten years of marriage, or survive
their worker spouse and are far from the age required for access-
ing benefits.258 Of course, challenges on these grounds typically
give rise to calls for more marital (or child) rights, not less.
259
fits, December 2002).
253. See id. (listing average combined benefits and reduced secondary widow(er) bene-
fits, December 2002).
254. See 42 U.S.C. § 426(a)(2)(A) (2000) (stating that eligibility for retirement, regard-
less of PIA, yields Medicare).
255. See Karen Damato, Spouses May Lose with Social Security Overhaul, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 3, 2005, at D2 (summarizing the uncertain impact of President Bush's proposed 
So-
cial Security reforms on spouses).
256. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 5, at 39 (noting economic independence 
of
unmarried couples).
257. See Alstott, supra note 244, at 2062 ("For secondary workers who ... receive 
the
spousal benefit.. . the payroll tax [to fund the program] is a true tax, because it 
confers no
incremental future benefits.").
258. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Adult Derivative Benefits in Social Security, 32 
STAN.
L. REV. 233, 243-44 (1980) (arguing that Social Security "fails to take into account the 
ef-
fect of women's dual roles on their participation in the labor force"); Liu, supra note 
124, at
17-23 (positing certain shortcomings of Social Security, including that the 
income-based
spousal benefit favors spouses of the well-paid, the impact of the ten-year divorce 
thresh-
old, and a "widow's gap" that arises between a worker's death and spousal retirement).
259. See Alstott, supra note 244, at 2059-66 (describing various "[fleminist 
proposals
for Social Security reform," most of which contemplate reforms that would increase, 
rather
than reduce, the relevant benefits).
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Second, Congress created spouse benefits in 1939.26 ° At first,
they were only for wives, although, after several amendments and
challenges, they are now for both sexes.26' In general, such bene-
fits were meant to shift Social Security from a "retirement plan
for individual workers, to a family benefit plan,"262 based on "gen-
erally valid presumptions" of dependency on "the wage earner."263
As the Supreme Court has noted, "Congress has used marital
status as a general guide to dependency."2" It has, however, lim-
ited this "guide" by the "dual entitlement rule," which not only
prevents a "double dip,"265 but also indicates that, in the end, de-
pendency, not marriage, is the key factor.
As posited above, the system's dependency presumption does
not easily translate to the unmarried. By choice or circumstance,
the overwhelming majority of unmarried couples (and singles as
such) are not financially interdependent.266 "In fact, many people
enter into nonmarital cohabitation to avoid ... the economic re-
sponsibilities and obligations of marriage."267 One could say that
the choice to cohabit does not negate dependency, particularly
where the right to marry is limited (e.g., same-sex marriage).26 In
260. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 214-15 (1977) (summarizing 1939 Social
Security amendments).
261. See id. at 215-17 (tracing and expanding the provision of Social Security benefits
for male spouses).
262. 1938 ADVISORY COUNCIL, THE SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD'S COMMENTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/38ssbadvise.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2006); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 654 (1975) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (noting Social Security's emphasis on "protection of the family").
263. Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 644 n.13 (citing REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL
INSURANCE AND TAXES TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 29
(1963)). Although the legislative history refers to female-male dependency, it is depend-
ency on "wage earner" that is key, regardless of gender.
264. Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 346 (1986). Indeed, "'that marriage changes de-
pendency is expressed throughout the Social Security Act." Id. (quoting Califano v. Jobst,
434 U.S. 47, 52 n.8 (1977)).
265. See Jonathan B. Forman, Making Social Security Work, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 153
(2004) (describing "dual entitlement rule").
266. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 5, at 39 (noting economic independence of
unmarried couples).
267. Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law Insti-
tute's "Domestic Partners" Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1189, 1209-10.
268. See Dee Ann Habegger, Note, Living in Sin and the Law: Benefits for Unmarried
Couples Dependent upon Sexual Orientation?, 33 IND. L. REV. 991, 1000 (2000) (noting that
"heterosexuals always have the option of getting married"). Yet, even for same-sex pairs,
the common wisdom suggests most are not financially interdependent. See Chambers, su-
pra note 82, at 475 ("[T]he employment of only one partner is likely to be the situation
more often in opposite-sex than in same-sex couples."). And, according to some studies,




most contexts, though, the option does exist, and given that Social
Security operates on a national scale based on legislative expecta-
tions of resources and need, presumptions of dependence are le-
gitimate, particularly in light of the independent reality of singles
or the typical unmarried couple, same-sex or otherwise.269 Social
Security "was designed to function into the indefinite future, and
its specific provisions rest on predictions as to expected economic
conditions which must inevitably prove less than wholly accurate,
and on judgments and preferences as to the proper allocation of
the Nation's resources."27 °
Third, there is no doubt that, for whatever its flaws, the
spousal benefit in Social Security also has a fairly strong, albeit
imperfect, relationship to expectations and rewards for child-
rearing, or other domestic work, or both.27' In this respect, what-
ever one thinks of the assumptions that give rise to the system,
the expectation that spousal benefits would, at least in part, com-
pensate women for unpaid work, either to care for children or in
the home generally, is present.1 2 It is true that such rewards, as
they are paid, are intimately tied to dependency in marriage,273
and do not necessarily require children or even actual domestic
work-and, thus, are perhaps over-inclusive.2 4 Further, to the
extent they are based in a spouse's work and not the value of
homemaking, they can be quite insufficient-and, thus, are per-
haps under-inclusive.275 Yet, even with these shortcomings, the
269. See Collett, supra note 7, at 386 (predicting "few, if any" spousal benefits to same-
sex couples if offered).
270. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960).
271. See COTT, supra note 5, at 178 (noting view of Social Security as "[flor the benefit
of child nurture," and supporting a "pattern in which husbands remained principal earn-
ers and wives were homemakers and childrearers"); Cohen, supra note 224, at 2238 (not-
ing recognition of"non-cash contributions" of spouses).
272. See Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security,
and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264,
280 (1989) (positing that "Social Security recognizes the value of women's domestic contri-
butions to the household economy only indirectly"); Blumberg, supra note 258, at 290-91
(noting that Social Security "was originally predicated upon the assumption of a worker-
homemaker marriage that endured until the death of one of the spouses").
273. See Becker, supra note 272, at 280.
274. See Alstott, supra note 244, at 2064 ("[T]he current spousal benefit ... provides
'unearned' benefits to wives [in that it] is available both to (low-earning) working wives
and to homemakers.").
275. See Liu, supra note 124, at 23 (citing ten-year marriage rule for divorcees and the
difference in spousal benefits based on the other's PIA in positing that Social Security fails
to "satisfy the principle of social contribution," or otherwise provide "benefits based on the
value of unpaid housework done by women").
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system is more than rational, particularly in comparison to the
treatment of the unmarried.
As noted above, Social Security is predicated on the expected
contributions and needs of its participants.276 As the Supreme
Court posited in Califano v. Jobst in 1977, "[g]eneral rules are es-
sential if a fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a
modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitably produce
seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases."277
With this goal in mind, the typical unmarried couple is, unlike
the married, a pair of dual-income, independent partners that, al-
though it certainly would involve domestic work (as it would for
even a single person), is unlikely to include a "stay-at-home"
member, much less one that would not want to participate in the
paid work force.27 To the extent such couples bear or raise chil-
dren, not only do more unmarried couples prefer not to have chil-
dren (approximately fifty percent of cohabiting couples are child-
less, as opposed to nineteen percent of married couples),2 79 but
studies also "indicate that cohabitors desire significantly fewer
children than married couples."280 Further, based on related re-
search, the nature of unmarried pairs, even with children, is such
that "[a]bout half' ultimately marry (thus, leading to treatment
as such under Social Security), and of those who choose not to,
only "about 10% last five years" or more.2"' Such data, whatever
its underlying merits, would not exactly reflect a "modicum of ef-
ficiency."
Assuming one accepts child-rearing as a basis for spousal bene-
fits, there are two other types of parents that need be consid-
ered-singles and same-sex pairs. For singles, there is no doubt
that their care and sacrifice for their children often border on the
heroic, and yet the reality-for better or worse-is that unless
they receive other aid, such parents must engage in paid em-
276. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 610 (describing Social Security's "predications").
277. 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977).
278. See Wardle, supra note 267, at 1209 ("[Tlhe financial expectations of parties who
cohabit differ markedly from persons who marry.").
279. JANE LAWLER DYE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS: FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: JUNE 2004, at 6 tbl.3 (2005) (es-
timating that 18.7% of married and approximately 50.3% of cohabiting couples are child-
less), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p20-555.pdf (last visited Feb. 20,
2006).
280. Duncan, supra note 84, at 1013.
281. J. Thomas Oldham, Lessons from Jerry Hall v. Mick Jagger Regarding U.S. Regu-




ployment regardless.28 2 To be sure, they do not receive further
benefits at retirement other than by their own work (unless they
have dependents), they do not receive survivor or divorce benefits
unless married,283 nor are their children helped pre-retirement.8 4
And yet, assuming their child's other parent has worked, that
other parent will likely also get benefits from that work (and,
with no "dual entitlement" dilution).285 Further, to the extent
child or other support is available from that parent (or by public
means), the situation, though unfortunate, is not made worse by
Social Security.28 6 With regard to same-sex couples, the typical re-
lation (at least at present) is, again, marked by independence.2 7
In addition, although methods for adding children to their rela-
tionships have increased, these still face uncertainty28 and do not
necessarily entail a breadwinner-stay-at-home pair, with its pre-
sumptive dependency dimension.28 9 Perhaps this will be reas-
sessed if such parenting gains in acceptance and a wider push is
made for a marriage-like model.29 ° Yet, no such child-based needs
282. Cf. Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Parents, Children, and Work-First Welfare Reform:
Where is the C in TANF?, 61 MD. L. REV. 308, 310 (2002) (positing that, often to the detri-
ment of single mothers (at least in childrens' formative years), "[w]elfare reform is viewed
as the story of getting single women to become self-sufficient, whether by work, marriage,
or child support, or through some combination of the three").
283. See Forman, supra note 265, at 159 (noting unmarried workers do not receive any
benefits beyond their own earnings-based amount, unless they were once married or have
dependents at retirement).
284. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Financial Support of Children and the End of Welfare
As We Know It, 81 VA. L. REV. 2523, 2573 (1995) (proposing pre-retirement Social Security
dependent benefits, presently unavailable before a parent's retirement, as a solution to
pre-retirement financial woes of single parents).
285. See Liu, supra note 124, at 10-11 (summarizing benefits derived from one's own
earnings).
286. See generally Sugarman, supra note 284, at 2523-37, 2561-64 (summarizing the
various sources and politics of support for children of single parents, including child sup-
port, work, and public assistance).
287. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 5, at 39 (noting economic independence of
non-married); Collett, supra note 7, at 386 (noting, on available data, the predictive "two
career" nature of same-sex marriage).
288. See Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 2020-24 (noting "sporadic and un-
certain" approach to same-sex couples by the courts, including on parenting and adoption
issues); see also Pamela Gatos, Note, Third-Parent Adoption in Lesbian and Gay Families,
26 VT. L. REV. 195, 204-17 (2001) (summarizing various legal and social challenges facing
same-sex parenting efforts).
289. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 9 (1996) (acknowl-
edging that "same-sex couples do not simply ape the mores of traditional marriage").
290. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 964 (rejecting alleged economic independence of
same-sex couples as a rationale for denying them state law benefits related to children).
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are being pressed in any systematic fashion at the present time
(at least via Social Security).291
4. Federal Income Taxes
In many ways, the foregoing Social Security analysis applies
similarly to federal income tax treatment of marriage in employ-
ment. Like Social Security, such treatment is not directly related
to a particular job, yet it requires considerations of income, ex-
pense, and dependency, all of which usually involve work.292 And,
in the end, the government's treatment of marriage via tax rates,
deductions, and incentives in employment ends up looking very
similar to Social Security. In fact, to the extent it is dissimilar,
such tax policy even furthers the argument that marriage is not
the source of employment rights that many claim. Whether it is
the effect and status of the "marriage bonus" (or penalty),29 the
impact of fringe benefit treatment,294 or the range of choice in the
system,295 federal taxation of work income... does not prefer mar-
riage over any other status to a degree warranting inferences of
rampant and baseless discrimination. In most cases, the actual
distinction between married and unmarried is minimal, and in
291. To be sure, Social Security is often raised by those alleging discrimination against
unmarried same-sex couples, but typically the challenges are from an equal treatment, not
a child-rearing, perspective. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 289, at 66-70 (listing Social
Security with potentially discriminatory benefits, but from a financial or social insurance,
not a parenting, perspective); Chambers, supra note 82, at 474-76. But see Eleanor Mi-
chael, Approaching Same-Sex Marriage: How Second Parent Adoption Cases Can Help
Courts Achieve The "Best Interests of the Same-Sex Family," 36 CONN. L. REV. 1439, 1465
(2004) (casting denial of spousal Social Security to same-sex parents in terms of family
financial health).
292. According to the Internal Revenue Service, salaries and wages accounted for ap-
proximately seventy-six percent of individual income amounts in 2003. See INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, PRELIMINARY DATA: SELECTED
INCOME AND TAX ITEMS, TAX YEARS 2002 AND 2003, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/03inOlfg.xls (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). Pensions or other retirement accounts (which
account for 7.5% of 2003 income) should also be included, at least derivatively, in employ-
ment-based income for tax purposes. See id. (listing income bases).
293. See, e.g., Mary Ann Milbourn, Setting the Stage: If 2004's Tax Breaks Look Famil-
iar, They Should, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 27, 2005 (describing status of "marriage
penalty" for 2004).
294. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 6, at 471-74 (describing taxation of fringe benefits and
marital status).
295. See, e.g., Berall, supra note 248, at 395-401 (summarizing alternatives for unmar-
ried couples for federal taxation of employment purposes).
296. Note that this discussion on employment taxation does not address the other non-
employment provisions of the tax code that address marriage, such as gift and estate
taxes. See John A. Hartog, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, SK070 ALI-ABA 81, 86
(2004) (summarizing gift and estate tax rules for married couples).
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some cases, the married can even be said to be discriminated
against. Once again, just as in Social Security, there is little ques-
tion that "traditional" couples can reap more benefits than others,
but, as discussed below, such benefits have more to do with ex-
pectations and need than any categorical endorsement of respec-
tive relationship forms.
The tax system "treats a married couple as a single economic
unit [wherein] [s]pouses report their combined income on a joint
return, and calculate their tax liability based on that combined
income."297 This "income" is then subject to a tax structure that,
at least as it has developed under the current progressive rate
approach (i.e., where higher income is taxed at higher rates),29
can be supported by a theory that "a [married] couple acts as an
economic unit by pooling its resources, and should be taxed ac-
cordingly."299 By taking a resource-based approach, the system,
intentionally or not,300 does not reflect all marriages, but only
those fitting the "economic unit" mold. Thus, there are "marriage
bonuses in some situations and marriage penalties in others,"3 '
with the difference based primarily not on marriage itself, but on
the choices of individuals and couples. In the end, it is more these
choices than marital status as such that create a difference, if
any, between married and unmarried (like Social Security). To be
sure, such choices can be influenced by the tax system, but this
influence should not be overemphasized.
297. Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 339
(1994). Couples can file as "[m]arried individuals filing separate returns." 26 U.S.C. § 1(d)
(2000). Yet, the advantages concern relative liability (i.e., individual, not joint) for owed
amounts and the limited ability to take advantage of otherwise unavailable deductions
(e.g., the 7.5% cap on deductible medical expenses), not a return to "unmarried" filing
status. See id. § 1(c) (showing unmarried filing status provisions); see also Ann F. Thomas,
Marriage and the Income Tax Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: A Primer and Legislative
Scorecard, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 12-13 (1999) (discussing the same filing issues).
Thus, only about two percent file as such. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, IRS
PUBLICATION 1304, at tbl.3.4 (2004) (indicating that for 2001, about forty-five million re-
turns were filed on joint filing status and two million were filed on married filing sepa-
rately), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/0lin34mt.xls (last visited Feb. 20,
2006).
298. See Zelenak, supra note 297, at 339 (noting that income tax "[pirogressivity means
that, as more income is added to a taxable unit, increasingly higher tax rates apply to the
added amounts of income").
299. Id. at 343.
300. See id. at 344-48 (positing that the "joint return" was not designed to support
marriage per se, but simply to allow "income splitting" in all states, not just in community
property ones, as was held in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (discussing separate prop-
erty) and Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (discussing community property)).
301. Id. at 340.
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i. Tax Rates
With regard to rates, in treating a married couple as a single
"economic unit," as opposed to a pair of singles, the system does
not simply double rate ranges. 32 Rather, it largely falls short of
such doubling in implicit or explicit recognition of income/expense
sharing. °3 Although this can yield a "bonus" for some couples,
particularly those with a single wage earner (for which any ex-
pansion helps) or a pair with rather disparate wages, most mod-
ern dual-income couples actually face a "penalty" due to the fail-
ure to expand rates enough. Granted, some doubling has been
temporarily adopted for low incomes,0 4 yet for middle to higher
ones, the brackets still reflect a "unit" model by not doubling.30 5
For example, in 2005 the twenty-five percent bracket for singles
is $29,700-$71,950, but for joint filers it only goes to $119,950
(not $143,900), with higher rates thereafter with similarly un-
even ranges.30 6 Again, any expansion, even if not doubled, does
help single-earner (or disparate earner) couples in that the in-
come is split to some degree. For example, in 2005 a single-earner
with $80,000 would pay a higher rate (twenty-eight percent) on
amounts over $71,950, whereas if the person married, that in-
come would be taxed at a lower rate (twenty-five percent).0 7 Yet,
such a "bonus" has become rarer for married couples, most of
302. See id. at 340 (noting that the current individual income tax structure imposes
"brackets [that] are wider than the brackets for single taxpayers, but less than twice as
wide").
303. See id. at 344 (acknowledging that the "standard justification for joint returns is
that the typical married couple pools its income," while disputing the historical basis and
present reality as explicit support).
304. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 ("EGTRRA"),
Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) and Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004
("WFTRA"), Pub. L. No. 108-311, 118 Stat. 1166 (2004) relieved some of the "marriage
penalty" by doubling lower brackets (ten percent and fifteen percent) and standard deduc-
tions. See id. Ellen D. Cook & Nathan Oestreich, WFTRA's Individual Income Tax Provi-
sions, 36 TAX ADVISER 98, 102-03 (2005) (describing relief). Yet, such relief expires in
2011. See id. at 98 (discussing expiration).
305. Cook & Oestreich, supra note 304 at 102-03 (showing relevant relief limited to
fifteen percent bracket (and below) and the standard deduction).
306. See Rev. Proc. 2004-71, 2004-50 I.R.B. 970, 971-72 (listing 2005 tax brackets).
307. See id. Rate expansion also helps those who file as "qualifying widow(er) with de-
pendent child" (i.e., "surviving spouse") for they have the same rates as joint filers. See id.
at 971. Yet, such filers are very rare (.06%) and are less likely to have much wage-based
income. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, IRS PUBLICATION 1304, at tbl.1.3 (2004) (listing
the number of 2001 tax returns by filing status), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/01inl3ms.xls (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
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whom, like their unmarried counterparts, are dual-income and
increasingly have fairly similar earnings. °8
There is no doubt that to the extent temporary "marriage pen-
alty" relief has been adopted at lower rates (fifteen percent and
below), 0 9 similarly situated dual-income pairs, especially lower
income pairs, are treated the same regardless of marriage.
310 Of
course, such relief still retains, and perhaps enlarges, a "bonus"
in that, as noted above, expanded rates always help single-earner
couples, 1' as well as ones with disparate wages.1 2 Yet, just as in
Social Security, this would generally only apply to those who fit a
more traditional model by way of economic choice, not marital
status. Indeed, based on available data, it appears that, just as in
Social Security, such "bonuses" would elude most couples that are
not, or cannot be, married based on their largely dual-income or
otherwise independent nature, 313 just like they would for most
similarly situated married couples. 3 4
Joint filing can yield differences for marriage, but not always in
the same way. Thus, there are "bonuses" for sole-earner pairs,
while other couples, especially those who deem it best for each
partner to work, often see penalties, despite recent tax changes.
15
To be sure, "it is impossible for a progressive-rate income tax to
neither encourage nor discourage marriage, meaning that people
308. See Collett, supra note 7, at 386 (describing same-sex pairs as "two careerU");
Crain, supra note 68, at 1877 n.3 (citing statistics showing most married couples are dual-
earning); Estin, supra note 72, at 1388 (noting "cohabitants are more likely than married
couples to have relatively comparable earnings").
309. See Jan M. Rosen, Your Taxes; That "Marriage Penalty" Defies an Easy Solution,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 2003, Sec. 3 (summarizing impact of the "marriage penalty" and its
partial relief in 2001).
310. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 107TH CONGRESS 25-28 (Comm. Print 2003) (positing equi-
table effect of marriage penalty relief in EGTRRA). Indeed, couples, married or not, who
pay little or no tax would naturally already be unaffected by joint filing.
311. See Cain, supra note 6, at 470 (noting that a "bonus" occurs whenever any degree
of splitting exists).
312. The Senate Finance Committee estimated in 2000 that couples with income dis-
parities of 70/30 or more receive a "marriage bonus." See S. Rep. No. 106-329, at 2 (2000).
313. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 5, at 39 (noting that "[clohabitors, far more
than spouses, are committed to economic independence" such that "income inequalities
[often] destabilize the relationship").
314. See Leslie A. Whittington & James Alm, Tax Reductions, Tax Changes, and the
Marriage Penalty, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 455, 457 (2001) (estimating only one-third to one-half of
married couples see a "bonus").
315. DOUGLAS A. KAHN & JEFFREY H. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 574-75, 578 (5th ed.
2005) (noting the circumstantial nature of the "marriage penalty," and not just in the
wage arena (e.g., capital loss limits)).
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who marry should pay neither more nor less than they paid on
the same income before they married, and also to tax all married
couples who have the same total income equally." 16 And, of
course, in the end, most of this is caused by a free choice (despite
the taxes) in favor of "coequal breadwinn[ing]" and away from a
traditional model.1 Yet, the fact remains that about half of all
married couples pay more (or at least the same) tax filing jointly
than if they filed singly;18 and one would expect a similar, if not
higher, disparate impact on same-sex (or unmarried) pairs if such
filing was required.31 9 Relevant estimates 32 ° are illustrated as fol-
lows:







Marriage Bonus Marriage Penalty Unaffected
N Percentage of joint filers (without
recent temporary relief)
E3 Percentage of joint filers (with recent
temporary relief)
316. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX: WHAT IT IS, How IT GOT THAT
WAY, AND WHERE WE Go FROM HERE 33 (1999).
317. Crain, supra note 68, at 1877; see also Zelenak, supra note 297, at 365 (arguing
that "widespread effects of the tax laws on decisions to marry are unproven").
318. See GRAETZ, supra note 316, at 29 (estimating "about two-thirds"); Whittington &
Alm, supra note 314, at 457 (estimating "penalty" affects forty-two percent to sixty percent
of married couples). It should be noted that recent "penalty" relief, see supra note 304, is
helpful, but it only eliminates the penalty for about nineteen percent of affected couples
and, regardless, expires in 2011. See Donald Kiefer et al., The Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Act of 2001: Overview and Assessment of Effects on Taxpayers, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 89,
95-96 (2002).
319. See, e.g., James Alm et al., Wedding Bell Blues: The Income Tax Consequences of
Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 201, 212 (2000) (positing tax penalty as
"most likely" on same-sex couples).
320. This rough chart balances Whittington & Alm's bonus figure of one-third to one-
half and penalty figure of "42 to 60 percent," see supra notes 314, 318, with Kiefer's relief
adjustments, see supra note 318.
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Indeed, rathei than marriage bias, it is often the reverse. And re-
gardless, the larger factor is economic, not marital. One might ar-
gue that, despite this reality, at least those eligible to marry have
a choice. Yet, again, the realities that typically mark the unmar-
ried point to the fact that such a choice would not mean much be-
yond its symbolism.32'
As an aside, one should consider that, to the extent there are
any differences between married and unmarried, there is a
chance the latter could bridge the gap by filing as "head of house-
hold," which essentially "splits the difference" between single and
joint rates. 2 The problem, however, is that such status is usually
limited to unmarried singles and relatives (e.g., children, par-
ents), not unrelated partners, or to a taxpayer living with a "de-
pendent" (i.e., one who receives "over half of [his] support . . .
from the taxpayer").3 23 It is conceivable that an unrelated partner
could qualify as a "dependent" (and, possibly, still retain the
benefit of single rates for his own wages).
3 24 However, not only
does the "dependent" definition state further that the relationship
must not violate local law, which might doom such filing in those
states where certain marriage alternatives are not allowed
325 (of
course, the U.S. Supreme Court's non-discrimination logic in
Lawrence v. Texas326 might pose a challenge), but more immedi-
ately, the studies of such couples suggest that the number of
those who would both fit the support threshold and refuse to take
321. See Jeannette Anderson Winn & Marshall Winn, Till Death Do We Split: Married
Couples and Single Persons Under the Individual Income Tax, 34 S.C. L. REV. 829, 846
n.71 (1983) ("Indeed, if most unmarried couples have dual incomes, joint treatment [i.e., as
a married couple] would not often be preferred.").
322. See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 315, at 579-80 (describing generally "head of house-
hold" status as one where taxpayer "pays taxes at rates that are lower than those imposed
on single taxpayers but higher than those imposed on married taxpayers filing a joint re-
turn"). For example, in 2005, the twenty-five percent bracket for "head of household" filers
is from $39,800 to $102,800 (rather than $29,700-$71,950 for singles; $59,400-$119,950
for married). See Rev. Proc. 2004-71, 2004-50 I.R.B. 970, 971-72 (listing rates).
323. 26 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2000). As an aside, and at a minimum, children can qualify as
dependents. See id.
324. See Berall, supra note 248, at 408 (on the possibility of "domestic partner... [be-
ing] a dependent").
325. See id. at 400 (noting that "both unmarried cohabitants and same sex married
couples appear ineligible for [dependency] status" in at least the thirty-nine states that
"have enacted Defense of Marriage Acts").
326. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). For discussion of the issue pre-Lawrence, see Cain, supra
note 6, at 472 n.30.
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advantage of the income split of single filing would be very
small.327
ii. Deductions, Exemptions, Exclusions, and Credits
Turning to other parts of the system relating to marriage in
employment-personal deductions/exemptions, benefit exclu-
sions, and income credits-we see, again, a focus on dependence,
not marriage. The personal deduction/exemption concerns an
ability to both take a higher standard deduction (if one does not
itemize) and exempt a certain amount of income due to joint filing
status and dependents. Benefit exclusions exclude payments by
employers for health care and other benefits for the taxpayer,
spouse, or dependents,329 while earned income credits offer pov-
erty protection.33 ° In general, "no dependency exemption deduc-
tion is allowed a taxpayer for his cohabitant, nor will there be any
exclusion from income if the cohabitant's employer pays for
health insurance [or other relevant benefits]."331 Yet, even more
than in rates, the personal deduction/exemption really only in-
ures to the benefit of those who fit the single breadwinner
model332-a rarity for most such couples.333 Similarly, couples that
327. Indeed, cohabitor "head of household" would not only defy data suggesting they
are "3.6 times more likely [than the married] to keep money separate," Kristen R. Heimdal
& Sharon K. Houseknecht, Cohabiting and Married Couples' Income Organization: Ap-
proaches in Sweden and the United States, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 525, 534 (2003), but
the rate expansion, which is about fifty percent, typically only helps those who fit a single-
earner model, see Knauer, supra note 32, at 134 (noting high income dual-earners benefit
little), something which is rare for such couples, see Estin, supra note 72, at 1388 (on dual-
income cohabitors).
328. See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 315, at 233-41 (describing standard, dependent ex-
emption deductions).
329. See id. at 154 (describing non-taxable medical insurance payments).
330. See id. at 556 (describing generally the earned income tax credit).
331. Berall, supra note 248, at 399. Again, at a minimum, children are dependents. See
supra note 323.
332. In general, there is no difference with regard to the personal exemption in that it
is available on an equal basis to all taxpayers/dependents ($3200 each in 2005, see Rev.
Proc. 2004-71, 2004-50 I.R.B. 970, 974). There is also an exemption "phaseout" on thresh-
olds less than double for the married than the unmarried (starting at $218,950 for married
in 2005; $145,950 for unmarried, see id.), which would typically only benefit one-earner
couples (the threshold only extends thirty-three percent at marriage). See Angela V. Lan-
glotz, Tying the Knot: The Tax Consequences of Marriage, 54 TAX LAW. 329, 337 (2001) (de-
scribing the phaseout). Further, given that the standard deduction for filing jointly is now
double the singles', see CCH TAX BRIEFING: WORKING FAMILIES TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2004
110 (2004), any two-person filing is the same.
333. See Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law
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benefit most from benefit exclusions are those with a non-working
partner 334-also a rarity." 5 Finally, although the income credit
can be higher for those filing jointly than as singles, it is much
less than double336 and, therefore, as long as each partner has any
income at all, the unmarried are actually better 
off.337
The first aspect of the personal deduction/exemption is the
standard deduction. This deduction, offered to those who do not
itemize tax-deductible expenses,
338  allows a taxpayer a set
amount (in 2005, $10,000 for joint filers and surviving spouses;
$5000 for non-head of household unmarried filers)
339 to be de-
ducted from gross income based on simplified expectations of nec-
essary expenses. 3 0 As just indicated, though, the doubling of this
deduction yields no difference between the married and unmar-
ried. 34' The second aspect-the personal exemption-allows
of Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 839-43 (2005) (summarizing economic
independence of cohabitors).
334. See, e.g., Collett, supra note 7, at 388-89 (noting "de minimis" benefit to insure
same-sex couples).
335. See LYNNE M. CASPER & SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY 57 (2002) (indicating non-working rates of 8.4% for never-married co-
habitors; 11.1% of once-married).
336. See Rev. Proc. 2004-71, 2004-50 I.R.B. 970, 973 (describing "phaseout" ranges of
the earned income credit with no children as $6530 to $11,750 for singles and $8530 to
$13,750 for married couples).
337. See Langlotz, supra note 332, at 341 (noting disparate impact of income credit
"phaseout" on married).
338. Although the decision to itemize is connected with amounts otherwise available
via standard deduction, itemized deductions are beyond the scope of this article given
their greater link to post-income expenditures than standard limitations on income. To the
extent marriage is a factor once a decision to itemize has been made, it really only arises
when deductions are so great that the "alternative minimum tax" becomes reality-a real-
ity which does, incidentally, disproportionately harm married couples in comparison to
unmarried. See id. at 348-49 (noting disproportionate exemption and "phase-out"
amounts).
339. See Rev. Proc. 2004-71, 2004-50 I.R.B. 970, 973 (listing standard deductions).
340. See Robert S. McIntyre & Michael J. McIntyre, Fixing the "Marriage Penalty"
Problem, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 907, 916-17 (1999) (describing simplification and poverty
avoidance purposes of standard deduction).
341. It should be noted that the deduction for "head of household" is $7300 in 2005, see
Rev. Proc. 2004-71, 2004-50 I.R.B. 970, 973, but, as posited above, it is unlikely that un-
married pairs could so file (even if allowed) given that they typically would not meet the
support threshold or would want to be given the benefit of single filing. See supra note 327
and accompanying text. Yet, even if they were allowed and inclined, the likely result
would not be equality with the married, but, in fact, they would be better off since the
married can only take a $10,000 deduction, see Rev. Proc. 2004-71, 2004-50 I.R.B. 970,
973, whereas "heads of household" have that deduction ($7300) and, possibly, a depend-
ent's as well (up to $5000). See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, IRS PUBLICATION 501 (2004).
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amounts (in 2005, $3200 per person)3 42 without regard to mar-
riage in further recognition of expectant need.343 This applies to
single, married, or "head of household" filers.3" Thus, again, no
inequality exists.34" As an aside, it should be noted that there is a
"phaseout" of personal exemptions based on overall income, but
the level for the married is less than twice that for the unmarried
(thirty-three percent). 346 Therefore, if anything, married couples
(as compared to unmarried ones) are more likely harmed, not
helped, by this disparity.34 v Further, in comparison to unmarried
singles, only the traditional single-earner (or disparately earning)
married couple is really helped (if at all), since the "phaseout" dif-
ference is lifted by such a small amount.
A common claim of disparate treatment between married and
unmarried couples in the income tax realm arises in the area of
tax-exempt benefits, primarily health care. As noted above,
unlike for the married, there is "generally" no "exclusion from in-
come if the cohabitant's employer pays for health insurance.
The same charge can be leveled at tax treatment of other bene-
fits, including health savings accounts,349 dependent care, 350 "de
minimis" fringes,351 and discounts, mandatory lodging, meals, or
"no-additional cost service[s] ,"3" although health care is the big
342. See Rev. Proc. 2004-71, 2004-50 I.R.B. 970, 974 (providing personal exemptions for
2005).
343. See McIntyre & McIntyre, supra note 340, at 917 (discussing the personal exemp-
tion).
344. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 341, at 9 (describing one personal
exemption per individual).
345. See Langlotz, supra note 332, at 337 (noting similar treatment of married and
unmarried for exemption).
346. See Rev. Proc. 2004-71, 2004-50 I.R.B. 970, 974 (noting 2005 phaseout at $218,950
married, $145,950 single).
347. See Langlotz, supra note 332, at 337 (noting "marriage penalty" in non-doubled
exemption phase-out).
348. Berall, supra note 248, at 399; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, IRS
PUBLICATION 15-B, at 5 (2005) (excluding certain COBRA premiums); Alden J. Bianchi,
HIPAA, COBRA, and Other Welfare Benefit Developments: Valuing and Taxing Employ-
ment-Based Medical Benefits Provided to Domestic Partners and Same-Sex Spouses,
SK064 ALI-ABA 817, 823-24 (2005) (describing income exclusion treatment).
349. See Bianchi, supra note 348, at 833 (noting "disparate tax treatment" of health
flexible savings account).
350. See Langlotz, supra note 332, at 342-43 (describing excluded "dependent care as-
sistance" provided by employers and credits for "out-of-pocket" "dependent care services
necessary for gainful employment").
351. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 348, at 6 (on de minimis "fringe"
benefits).
352. See Cain, supra note 6, at 471-72 (discussing "no additional-cost service[s]" and
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target.3 3 Generally, "[e]xcept for the rare case in which the ...
life partner of the employee qualifies as a dependent" 151 (defined
above in the "head of household" discussion), the tax-free treat-
ment of such benefits for married pairs, but not unmarried ones,
is a disparate benefit. And yet, on closer examination, the actual
benefit may not be quite as valuable to the respective couples as
one might think.
Taking the smaller items first, the results are mixed. De mini-
mis benefits include things like picnics, low-value gifts, occasional
entertainment, and minor personal use of copiers, and are of "so
little value [and regularity] . . . that accounting for [them] would
be unreasonable or administratively impracticable."
355 Yet, such
items are excluded not only for spouses, but for "any recipient,"
35 6
and thus there is no disparate treatment. Discounts, waivers,
working condition fringes, or no-additional cost services, if given
at all, for spouses generally extend only to minor employee dis-
counts (usually about twenty percent or less),
357 minimal use (at
least by spouses) of college tuition reductions for employees of col-
leges or universities,3 58 rather rare (or at least non-duplicative)
meals or lodging,359 or very specific items like travel for airline
workers360 or other "excess capacity services. "361 With the argu-
.qualified employee discount[s]").
353. See id. at 472 (noting importance of health insurance to "most working Ameri-
cans").
354. Id.
355. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 348, at 6.
356. Id.; see also id. at 11-12 (describing similar tax exclusion of"de minimis meals").
357. See id. at 8 (describing "employee discounts").
358. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, IRS PUBLICATION 970, at 8 (2004) (discussing
"qualified tuition reduction"), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p970.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 22, 2006). A "qualified tuition reduction" is excluded from income, see 26 U.S.C. 
§
117 (d)(1)-(2) (2000), for employees, spouses, and dependents, "is available only to a 
lim-
ited group of taxpayers," see Robert J. Rosepink, No Taxpayer Left Behind: Taxwise 
Tech-
niques for Funding Education, SK069 ALI-ABA 1295, 1383 (2005), and is typically 
de-
signed for children, and not spouses, see generally John Nevin Kennedy, The Income Tax
Status of University Employees' Tuition Assistance Programs, 96 DICK. L. REV. 281 
(1992).
359. See 26 U.S.C. § 119 (2000) (excluding on-premises lodging and meals for employ-
ees and spouses). This author could find no reported cases on the taxation of lodging 
or
meals for unmarried partners, apart from the general assumption that they would 
be
taxed. See Christopher J. Hayes, Note, Married Filing Jointly: Federal Recognition 
of
Same-Sex Marriages Under the Internal Revenue Code, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1593, 
1599-1602
(1996) (discussing "meals and lodging"). Therefore, it would appear that such benefits 
are
either not largely provided to this population or any such offering of facilities or 
meals
would be inconsequential.
360. See Cain, supra note 6, at 471-72 (describing "tax-free airline travel" for spouses).
361. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 348, at 13-14 (describing travel, hotel,
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able exception of meals or lodging,362 the married (as well as
widow(er)s) are treated differently for these benefits, some of
which can be quite helpful in individual cases, particularly for
widow(er)s. And yet, they are hardly the stuff of which civil rights
battles are made. Finally, dependent care, usually child-care, is
also excluded up to a certain cap ($5000 in 2005).363 Far from be-
ing a benefit, however, this cap is imposed regardless of marriage,
resulting in a potential penalty to joint filers.3"
Turning to the "big ticket item" of health care and related bene-
fits, it would first seem that tax-free coverage if offered for a
spouse, but not unmarried partner, is of great benefit, particu-
larly by comparison.365 Indeed, for modern workers, such coverage
constitutes about seven percent of compensation,366 and there is
no doubt it is encouraged by its tax status, in that the employer
can grant and, presumably receives in return, the full dollar
value, rather than having it, like wages, taxed on receipt, 367 and
that otherwise uninsured or minimally insured couples can be
helped greatly. 368 Once again, though, the practical reality, par-
ticularly in comparison to the unmarried, is that although it can
be a great benefit, tax-exempt health care is not as significant as
some might assume.
First, only sixty-three percent of employers offer coverage (in-
dividual or family) at all.369 Moreover, for married couples, "[i]f
and phone discounts).
362. Despite the possibility that cohabitors may not benefit from the spousal provisions
for meals or lodging, see supra note 359, it is unclear that Congress's 1978 amendment of
26 U.S.C. § 119(a) to include spouses was designed to be an exclusionary, rather than a
clarifying, measure. See generally H.R. REP. No. 95-1232 (1978).
363. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 348, at 7 (discussing "dependent care
assistance").
364. See Langlotz, supra note 332, at 342 (describing marriage penalty via dependent
care exclusion).
365. See Knauer, supra note 32, at 169-70 (describing health care as the "largest single
item" for the married). This discussion includes payments for COBRA, see INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 348, at 5 (describing exclusion for COBRA premiums), and
health savings accounts, see Bianchi, supra note 348, at 833 (discussing health accounts).
366. See BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY:
EMPLOYER COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION-DECEMBER 2004, tbls.2, 5 (2005) (show-
ing average cost for public employers of 7.3% of compensation for health care; 6.6% for pri-
vate firms), available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/home.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
367. See Pettit, supra note 125, at 784-85 (discussing financial incentives to employers
to provide health care coverage in lieu of wage compensation).
368. See Collett, supra note 7, at 389 (noting coverage of "previously uninsured part-
ner" is a great benefit).
369. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2004 ANNUAL SURVEY
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both partners are employed by employers providing insurance
benefits, it is rarely advantageous for one to enroll as a benefici-
ary under the plan sponsored by the [other's] employer," espe-
cially since this usually requires a fee.37° Given these realities,
and that most married couples are dual-income,
37' their use of
these plans, at least as a couple, is far from universal.
2 In fact,
for the unmarried, "[e]vidence from existing plans shows that en-
rollment rises very little, usually 1% or less and almost always
less than 2% when ... offered to same-sex and opposite-sex part-
ners."37 3 One reason is that, again, they-even more than the
married-tend to be dual-earning, and thus each is likely already
covered 374 -and would likely prefer it that way.
5 Although taxes
may play a role,376 it would seem to be economically irrational for
an uncovered person to prefer to buy insurance at full price on
the open market rather than bear the (admittedly disparate) tax
on another's plan.377 Further, even if partner coverage were avail-
5-6 (2004) (summarizing survey data indicating sixty-three percent of employers 
offer
health coverage), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7148/upload/2004-Employer-
Health-Benefits-Survey-Full-Report.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
370. Collett, supra note 7, at 388-89. As an aside, the rate for covered 
employees who
decline coverage is eighteen percent. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 
369, at 6 (not-
ing eighty-two percent enrollment).
371. See BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., CURRENT 
POPULATION SURVEY:
EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES IN 2004 (2005) (estimating 
fifty-one percent
of married as dual-income), available at http://www.bls.gov/lnewsrelease/pdf/famee.pdf
(last visited Feb. 22, 2006); see also Crain, supra note 68, at 1877 n.3 (citing 
other esti-
mates as high as sixty-one percent).
372. Although an exact figure is difficult, the data that exists suggests 
seventy-two
percent of all married couples have employer health care, see KAISER 
COMM'N ON
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 
IN AMERICA tbl.1 (2004)
(listing coverage), available at http://www.kff.orgluninsured/upload/Health-Insurance-
Coverage-in-America-2003-Data-Update-Report.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2006), and, thus,
at a minimum, those relying solely on coverage through one spouse would 
be less than sev-
enty-two percent given that this figure necessarily includes dual-income 
marriages, see
Crain, supra note 68, at 1877 n.3 (discussing dual incomes), many of 
whom would have
access to two plans and, thus, would not necessarily access benefits by marriage.
373. M.V. Lee Badgett, Calculating Costs with Credibility: Health Care 
Benefits for
Domestic Partners, 5 ANGLES 1 (2000); see also Collett, supra note 7, at 
388-89.
374. See id. at 2 (citing dual coverage, stigma, and taxes as possible 
reasons for low
numbers electing partner coverage); Grant Arthur Gochin & Brian H. 
Kleiner, Expanding
the Family Definition: Health Care for Domestic Partners, 18 EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 
INT L
111, 112 (1999) ("Most homosexual relationships are a two adult working 
family.., most
homosexuals have health insurance through their own employer.").
375. See Garrison, supra note 333, at 843 (observing that "'cohabitors, 
striving to be
independent ... avoid the interdependence that pooling [finances] brings'" 
(footnote omit-
ted)).
376. See Badgett, supra note 373, at 2 (citing tax differential in health care 
coverage for
unmarried pairs).
377. See Hayes, supra note 359, at 1600 n.21 ("[Tihe tax costs [of unmarried 
coverage]
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able and it cost less than coverage on the open market or one's
own plan (which is doubtful)37 it would still be understandable
that, given their typically independent, dual-earning, often
shorter-termed, and even uncertain nature3 7 9 most such couples
would be unlikely to elect joint coverage.
As noted above, the last federal tax treatment of employment is
the earned income tax credit.38 ' This credit, which is offered to
those with incomes below certain amounts, is meant "to provide
relief to low income families who pay little or no income tax, and
• . .to provide an incentive for low income people to work rather
than to receive federal assistance."38' The "designated amount"
ranges are increased for joint filers, but less than twice those for
singles, 382 and thus as long as each partner is eligible for the
may be significantly cheaper than purchasing the same service on the open market....").
Further, this tax, which is on the "fair market value," would likely be on the COBRA rate
(i.e., 102% of the "applicable premium" on existing coverage), see 29 U.S.C. § 1164 (2000),
not the open market. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980B(f)(4)(A) (2000) (COBRA rate is "cost"); Bian-
chi, supra note 348, at 832 (noting "consensus" on COBRA). And, "[e]mployer-sponsored
coverage is generally less costly than similar coverage purchased in the individual mar-
ket," in that "for large firms [it] is about 40 percent lower than that for individuals."
Sherry A. Glied & Phyllis C. Borzi, The Current State of Employment-Based Health Cover-
age, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 404, 407 (2004).
378. See BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY:
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002-2003, at 30-31
tbls.22-23 (2005) (showing average single premium of $201.89, with employee contribu-
tion of $60.24, while for families the numbers were $482.15 and $228.98, respectively, and,
thus, unmarried pairs, at least without children, are likely better off with dual single,
than family coverage), available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebblO020.pdf (last visited
Feb. 22, 2006). As an aside, such benefits are, in fact, tax-deductible to the employer. See
Hayes, supra note 359, at 1600 n.21 (noting deductibility of domestic partner benefits).
379. See M.V. LEE BADGETT, MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE ECONOMIC LIVES OF
LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 83-84 (2001) (citing "studies of gay couples show[ing] high rates
of labor force participation for both partners in a couple as well as a strong norm of equal
participation in the paid labor force," federal tax treatment, and "the closet" as factors
leading to few domestic partner enrollees in partner health care, even when offered); Julie
Brines & Kara Joyner, The Ties the Bind: Principles of Cohesion in Cohabitation and Mar-
riage, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 333, 350 (1999) (asserting that "survival of [cohabitor] arrange-
ments appears to depend not on principles of specialization but on equal power-sharing");
Larry Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Children's
Family Contexts in the United States, 54 POPULATION STUD. 29, 33 (2000) (noting short-
term nature of cohabiting couples, "with about half lasting a year or less, only one-sixth
lasting three years, and about a tenth lasting five years or longer").
380. See 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2000) (codifying the earned income tax credit).
381. Rucker v. Sec'y of Treas. of United States, 751 F.2d 351, 356 (10th Cir. 1984).
382. See Rev. Proc. 2004-71, 2004-50 I.R.B. 970, 973 (describing "phaseout" ranges ofthe earned income credit with no children as $6,530 to $11,750 for singles and $8,530 to
$13,750 for married couples filing jointly), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/
irb04-50. pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
[Vol. 40:867
LOVE DOESN'T PAY
credit, unmarried couples can actually receive more than married
ones under this provision.8 3
5. Civil Servant Benefits
The final federal treatment of marriage at work concerns those
who work for the government itself. Perhaps this fits better in
Part IV, which discusses voluntary rights and benefits offered by
private employers, in that, for the most part, the government acts
like any other employer. And yet, when noting its responsibilities
and supposed interest in marriage as a "'basic civil right[] of
man,' 384 as well as the sheer size of its payroll, the government's
treatment of workers offers insight into what it might otherwise
expect from employers voluntarily, if not by law. Civil servant
benefits are "provided by the United States to those in federal
service and their families," including "current and retired federal
officers and employees, members of the Armed Forces, elected of-
ficials, and judges."38 5 At present, the numbers of such workers
are: 1.9 million general service, 86-845,000 postal service,8 7 and
2.5 million armed service,388 or 3.5% of the total labor force.38 9
Although rights and benefits depend on one's position in the
federal government, those afforded to married workers that draw
the most attention are health care, life insurance, retirement
benefit rights, treatment of on-the-job injuries, FMLA-type leave,
and certain moving costs. 390 For those in military service, other
benefits like commissary privileges and assistance at separation
383. See Langlotz, supra note 332, at 341 (noting the disparate impact of the earned
income credit "phaseout").
384. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
385. 1997 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 4.
386. See BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., CAREER GUIDE TO INDUSTRIES,
2004-05 EDITION 249 tbl.1 (2004) (estimating non-postal service government payroll of
1.871 million workers).
387. See BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK
HANDBOOK, 2004-05 EDITION 467 (2004) (estimating 845,000 postal service employees),
available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocosl4l.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
388. See id. at 640 (estimating that at least 1.4 million active duty and 1.1 million re-
serve serve in the armed forces).
389. See Press Release, Bureau of Lab. Stat., U.S. Dep't of Lab., The Employment
Situation: June 2005, 2 tbl.A (July 8, 2005) (on file with author) (indicating a total civilian
workforce of 149.1 million, and, thus, with 2.5 million military (or 151.6 million total),
5.245 million workers would be about 3.5%), available at http://bls/gov/news.release/ar
chives/empsit_07082005.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2006)..
390. See 1997 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 5 (listing civil servant benefits).
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from service also inure uniquely to the married.391 Given the defi-
nition of "marriage" by the DOMA,392 there is little doubt that
benefits afforded to the married (as such) do not otherwise extend
to unmarried or same-sex couples.393 Yet, again, in reality, the
rights and benefits may not be as great as one might assume.
As with most employers, the health benefits offered by the fed-
eral government are certainly a distinct help to single wage-
earner or underinsured couples. At present, the government of-
fers participation to singles or families of employees or retirees in
plans from approved providers in their state,394 and contributes
up to "72% of the weighted average" cost for such coverage na-
tionally.395 "Family" includes a "spouse" (who also can continue
coverage after an employee's death or divorce) and dependents.396
Thus, if a spouse is either not covered or is otherwise unsatisfied
with coverage by his or her own employer, marriage affords an al-
ternative. Of course, the "if' in this proposition is rather impor-
tant, especially when comparing married and unmarried pairs.
Indeed, based on the choices and preferences of unmarried cou-
ples,3 97 there is little reason to think that the small enrollment in-
crease by such couples in private plans, if offered,398 would be any
different in public ones, thus in reality making any disparate ef-
fects similarly small.
With regard to pension, federal workers generally participate
in the Civil Service Retirement System (the "CSRS") for those
hired pre-1984 or the Federal Employees Retirement System (the
"FERS") for those hired since 1984." 9 Although there is no mar-
391. See id. (listing military benefits).
392. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (defining marriage).
393. See MERIN, supra note 18, at 228-29 (describing effect of DOMA on civil service
"benefit entitlements").
394. See 5 U.S.C. § 8905 (2000) (concerning election of civil servant health coverage).
395. 5 U.S.C.A. § 8906(b)(1) (West Supp. 2005) (setting the government's contribution
percentage).
396. See 5 U.S.C. at 8901(5) (2000) (defining "member of family" for civil servant pur-
poses).
397. See Garrison, supra note 333, at 843 (noting that cohabitors "'striv[e] to be inde-
pendent'") (quoting PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY,
WORK, SEX 110 (1983)); Gochin & Kleiner, supra note 374, at 112 ("[M]ost homosexuals
have health insurance through their own employer.").
398. See Badgett, supra note 373, at 1 (describing limited enrollment of same-sex cou-
ples, when offered).
399. See U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS FISCAL YEAR
2003: FEDERAL EMPLOYEE BENEFITS PROGRAM 2-3 (2004) (on retirement programs, includ-
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riage-based benefit increase during a retiree's life, a widow or
widower, but not an unmarried partner, can continue benefits af-
ter a retiree's death.4"' Like most private systems, however, such
benefits come at a price. In this case, a survivor benefit is one-
half the retiree's pension, but it costs a ten percent reduction of
that pension while the retiree is alive.4"1 Although the impact of
this tradeoff depends on the couple, the benefit is designed to be
paid by the reduction,4 2 and thus the unmarried, on balance, suf-
fer little harm overall (and have the ten percent to invest for one
another's protection if they want). In addition to retiree benefits,
both the CSRS and FERS provide a lump-sum (and annuity if ten
years of service) to a widow(er) with no offset if a spouse dies
when employed.40 3 Undoubtedly, this is a benefit unique to mar-
ried couples. Yet, it should be noted further that only about six-
teen percent of all survivor annuitants presently receive benefits
in this fashion.40 4
With regard to the rarer, more minor or ambiguous benefits
that implicate marriage in federal work, the government also of-
fers on-the-job injury (disability) coverage," 5 life insurance (em-
ployee or spouse), spousal sick leave, moving costs, and, most re-
cently, long-term care insurance. On-the-job injury benefits
contemplate spouses to an extent. If the employee sustains an in-
jury at work and lives, he or she receives a monthly benefit ac-
cording to a schedule based on injury severity and type40 6 that is
ing early, normal, and disability options).
400. See id. at 2, 4 (describing death benefits under CSRS and FERS, respectively).
401. See U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., Federal Employees Retirement System
(An Overview of Your Benefits) (on "survivor benefits"), http://www.opm.gov/ferselection/
ri_ 90/f bbp.htm#sb (last visited Feb. 20, 2006); see also 5 U.S.C. § 8339(j) (2000).
402. See U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., supra note 401 (stating the reason for the
reduction for "spouse survivor benefits"); see also Lomman v. Office of Personnel Mgmt.,
No. 02-3356, 2003 WL 23415937, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 2003) (describing same reduction
in retiree benefits to pay for spousal benefits).
403. See 5 U.S.C. § 8442(b)(1) (2000) (discussing the widower benefit). FERS also pays
survivors of those who die pre-retirement amounts related to pre-death contributions, but
anyone (not just spouses) can be designated, see id. § 8424(d), just like all other amounts
owed at death. See, e.g., id. § 5582(a) (explaining the procedure for final payments).
404. See U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., supra note 399, at 14 (indicating, in 2003,
only 99,642 out of all 632,004 annuitants obtained benefit status due to the death of a
working, not retired, spouse).
405. Note that non-job injuries may otherwise be covered by the disability retirement
program, which follows the FERS retirement discussion in the previous paragraph. See 5
U.S.C. § 8451(a)(1)(B) (2000).
406. See id. §§ 8102, 8105-8107 (providing benefits under the Federal Employees' Com-
pensation Act).
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increased by 8.33% for a spouse, child, or dependent parent.407 If
the employee dies, a benefit is paid in order of precedence that
runs generally from spouse to minor child to dependent parent. °8
This dependent increase and death benefit offer a distinct advan-
tage to eligible spouses, although the increase at issue is given,
and only once, if there is any dependent (not just a spouse),4 9 and
the average total number of federal workers who die in the line of
duty per year is about 192,410 or .007% of the non-military federal
workforce. u
The rest of the federal benefits are a mixed (bordering on
empty) bag in terms of marriage. For example, employee life in-
surance is offered to spouses, but only if another beneficiary is
407. See id. § 8110(b) (explaining disability benefit augmentation based on depend-
ents).
408. See id. § 8133 (death benefit). Also, if the employee is injured yet dies from other
causes, any unpaid injury benefits are also afforded survivors in a spouse-child-parent or-
der. See id. § 8109(a).
409. See id. § 8110(b) (describing benefit augmentation).
410. See Stephen M. Pegula, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Fatal Oc-
cupational Injuries to Government Workers, 1992 to 2001 (noting 1923 federal worker
deaths from 1992 to 2001 (including over 200 lost at Oklahoma City in 1995 and in New
York and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001), available at http://www.bls.gov/
opub/cwc/sh20040223ar01p1.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
411. See id. (noting 1923 worker deaths); see also BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., supra notes
386 and 387 (indicating 2.745 million non-military workers). It should also be noted that
in addition to its workers, the government also maintains a death benefit for all public
safety officers. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (2000). Yet, it is available to a spouse or designated
beneficiary. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (Supp. II 2002). There is also a spousal education benefit
for those harmed on duty, although the numbers are small. See id.; Pegula, supra note
410, at tbl.2 (indicating 339 state and 1495 local "public order and safety" deaths in 1992-
2001, including those killed on September 11, 2001).
The government also mandates "family" benefits to very small populations. For exam-
ple, death or disability benefits are provided for miners under the Black Lung Benefits
Act. 30 U.S.C. § 901 (2000). Unfortunately, very few qualify. See Gardiner Harris, Dust,
Deception & Death: Few Miners Pass Tough Test for Federal Benefits, COURIER-J. (Louis-
ville, Ky.), Apr. 25, 1998, available at http://courier-journal.com/dust/frame-compensa
tion.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). Damages are available to railway employees under
the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2000), and to seamen under the Jones
Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (2000), and Death on the High Seas Act, id. § 761(a). However,
these statutes require negligence and the number of deaths, even if all were married, is
small. See JACK B. HOOD ET AL., WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYEE PROTECTION
LAwS 16-18 (3d ed. 1999); see also BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 2003
CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES, tbl.A-1 at 11 (2004) [hereinafter BLS CENSUS]
(for example, only eighteen rail and twenty-four water deaths in 2003). Benefits are avail-
able for harbor workers, overseas contractors, and natural resource workers through the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C. § 901 (2000). See also HOOD
ET AL., supra, at 17-20 (describing industries affected by this Act). Again, the numbers are




not designated.412 Optional spousal life insurance is offered, but
only up to $5000 and with the premiums paid by the employee.413
Long-term care insurance is available to employees and
spouses, 4 ' yet, even though they may benefit from the risk pool,
employees are "responsible for 100 percent of the premiums."4 5
Family leave to care for a sick spouse is available as well, but just
like the FMLA, it is unpaid, and thus unlikely to be taken very
often for this purpose.41 '6 Finally, limited moving and relocation
expenses are paid for employees and "immediate family,"4 '7 yet
the statute offering this benefit offers no definition of "family,"
41
and thus, it would be just as logical to infer flexibility as it would
discrimination.
With regard to the military, soldier spouses receive many bene-
fits similar to those just listed for civil servants generally,41 9 in
addition to other, perhaps more significant benefits such as in-
creased housing allowances, supplemental aid to low-income
members, and separation support, 420 as well as rather minor
benefits such as commissary privileges, transition assistance
upon separation from service, and education assistance.42 ' There
is no question that many military benefits, such as disability cov-
erage, death benefits, or, for that matter, housing aid, are more
common and significant in this context than for civil servants
412. See 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a) (2000) (providing order of precedence for life insurance
claims).
413. See id. § 8714(c) (providing for optional life insurance on family members).
414. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 9001 (West Supp. 2005) (defining eligibility for long-term care
coverage).
415. 5 U.S.C. § 9004(a) (2000).
416. See Waldfogel, supra note 155, at 20-21 (5.9% of FMLA leave is spousal care).
417. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 5724(a) (2000) (providing for relocation expenses for trans-
ferred employees).
418. See generally id. § 5701 (offering no definition of "immediate family" for civil ser-
vant benefit).
419. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1076 (2000) (providing for dependent health care coverage);
38 U.S.C. §§ 1115, 1135 (2000) (providing for compensation for dependents of veterans dis-
abled in service); id. § 1310 (providing for a death benefit to spouse, children, or parent for
service-related death); id. § 3500 (noting congressional intent on providing an education
benefit on death).
420. See 37 U.S.C. § 403 (2000) (providing for housing allowances including depend-
ents); id. § 402a (providing for aid to low-income soldiers with dependents); id. § 427 (pro-
viding for family separation allowance).
421. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1061 (2000) (providing for commissary privileges); id. §
1142(b)(5) (providing for job counseling); id. § 2147 (providing for an ability to transfer
education benefits to spouse on reenlistment); 37 U.S.C. § 411f (2000) (providing for pay-
ment of expenses for family to attend burial of soldier who dies on duty).
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generally.422 Yet, unlike on the civilian side, where unmarried
couples are only unrecognized, such relationships are, for better
or worse, largely barred in the military.423 Thus, even if married
soldiers have and use such benefits disproportionately to unmar-
ried ones, the latter would not be otherwise similarly situated for
their receipt.
Before leaving civil servants and federal law altogether, it
should be noted that the Supreme Court has also recognized a
constitutional "freedom to marry" that conceivably applies to such
workers (and state civil servants as well). 424 As applied, this
"freedom" requires any public act that "significantly interferes"
with marriage to receive a "'critical examination' of the relevant
state interest.4 5 The challenges that have been made in the civil
servant context, however, have been largely rejected on the
ground that any relevant job rules or policies (e.g., anti-nepotism,
financial disclosure rules) cannot really be said to "significantly
interfere[]" with a "decision[] to enter into [marriage]."426 In fact,
in the very case that gave voice to the marriage right, the Court
distinguished marriage rules in another indirectly work-related
area-Social Security.427 Thus, any constitutional source of rights
in this context, at least as conceived to this point, is dubious at
best.
422. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VETERAN DATA & INFORMATION, tbl. 12,
(indicating 810,417 disabled veterans with dependents receiving disability benefits as of
September 30, 2002), available at http://www.va.gov/vetdata/ProgramStatics/stat-app02/
Table%2012% 20(02).xls (last visited Feb. 20, 2006); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY
CASUALTY INFORMATION, U.S. ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY DEATHS, 1980 THROUGH 2004 (show-
ing average annual active duty death toll of approximately 1500), available at
http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/casualty/castop. htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
423. See Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Family Law, supra note 195, at 363-64 (describing
military limits on same-sex relationships); see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES at IV-101, IV-79 (2000) (discussing prohibitions on "wrongful cohabitation" and
certain sexual behavior, respectively), available at http://www/jag.navy.mil/documents/
mcm2000.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
424. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (discussing constitutional dimension
of marriage).
425. Id. (internal citations omitted).
426. Id. at 386; see also Cutts v. Fowler, 692 F.2d 138, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating
that an anti-nepotism policy did not cause a burden on marriage); Duplantier v. U.S., 606
F.2d 654, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that financial disclosures by federal judges con-
taining information about their spouses and children do not violate notions of due process
or equal protection).
427. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386-87 (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 55 & n.12
(1977), which approved the denial of child's Social Security at marriage as a "reasonable"
result that does not unduly hinder marriage).
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B. State Rights and Benefits
As noted in Part I above, state and local laws also give insight
into marriage at work. In general, though, they continue the
trend found in federal law-minimal support, with exceptions
based on presumptions of need or dependence, not relationship
form. The most relevant such laws concern: (1) workers' compen-
sation;42 (2) unemployment compensation;4 29 (3) insurance ac-
cess;43 ° (4) "marital status" discrimination;
43' (5) family leave;43 2
(6) wage payments;4 33 and (7) income tax.4 34 Like the federal sys-
tem, such laws also contemplate marriage for civil servants.4 35 On
the whole, though, other than a few tax provisions and civil ser-
vant benefits, marriage support at the state or local level is even
more limited than in federal law. This is due partly to the fact
that ERISA preempts many non-federal laws that "relate to" em-
ployee benefits;43 6 yet it is also, and perhaps more significantly, a
continuation of the philosophy that considers workers more as in-
dividuals than providers for a family-at least in law.
1. Workers' Compensation
Workers' compensation, which exists in all states, is a state-
based system of fixed compensation for injuries on the job.437 De-
428. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.16 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005) (describing fifty per-
cent weekly wage benefit to a spouse in the event of covered employee's death from an on-
the-job accident).
429. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West Supp. 2005) ("good cause" leave for
unemployment compensation includes a move with a "spouse or domestic partner" to an
impracticable distance).
430. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 884 (Vt. 1999) (describing enhanced insur-
ance as benefit).
431. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (Consol. 1995) (setting forth state "marital
status" discrimination law).
432. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.150-59 (2003) (granting state medical leave to
care for sick spouse).
433. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-9-104 (2004) (requiring spousal consent for wage
assignments).
434. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993) (describing "state income
tax advantages").
435. See, e.g., 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-118 (West 2002) (granting survivor annui-
ties to spouses of state workers).
436. See Jeffrey A. Brauch, Municipal Activism v. Federal Law: Why ERISA Preempts
San Francisco-Style Domestic Partner Ordinances, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 925, 961-62
(1998) (describing preemption).
437. See Gabel, supra note 130, at 1084-90 (describing origins and form of workers'
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veloped from European models in the early to mid-twentieth cen-
tury438 and encouraged by federal safety laws and some of the
federal civil servant benefits noted above,439 the typical system
consists of guaranteed (i.e., no-fault), limited compensation in the
event of a job-related injury in exchange for a waiver of otherwise
available (i.e., tort) remedies.440 Compensation normally includes
medical costs and a set percentage of the employee's wages, typi-
cally two-thirds up to a set maximum in the event of total disabil-
ity,441 and is meant "to resolve on-the-job injuries uniformly, effi-
ciently, predictably, and fairly."442 In most states, "employers
must carry insurance" to pay for the program, with each of their
premiums "reflect[ing] generally the level of risks faced by [their
own] workers."443 Although there is typically no increase in bene-
fits due to marital status in an employee's life,4" most states offer
survivor benefits to spouses and dependents, primarily children,
"to answer subsistence level needs"445 and to "protect workers and
their families from the catastrophic economic consequences of
workplace injuries and fatalities. "446
Professor Arthur Larson's treatise summarizes death benefits
as follows: "All [state] statutes provide death benefits for the de-
compensation systems).
438. See HOOD ET AL., supra note 411, at 6-12 (describing European influence on work-
ers' compensation).
439. See Gabel, supra note 130, at 1087 (noting role of federal safety laws and laws on
federal civil servants, miners, and longshoremen as workers' compensation guideposts for
states).
440. See Thomas A. Eaton & David B. Mustard, Report of the Governor's Workers'
Compensation Review Commission, 38 GA. L. REV. 1241, 1256 (2004) (noting workers'
compensation "fundamental features").
441. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Jay Barker, Compensation for Injury & Illness: An Update
of the Conrad-Morgan Tabulations, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 913, 932 (1986) (noting that "[s]tates
typically require the employer to pay two-thirds of the totally disabled worker's lost
weekly wages," up to applicable statutory maximums). For "permanent partial disabili-
ties" (i.e., where an injured worker can still work), lower wage percentages are the typical
method of wage loss (if any) compensation. See id. at 933 (describing "permanent partial").
In addition, most states also offer set amounts for "specified injuries that cause permanent
partial disabilities, such as ... damage to limbs, eyes, hearing or other functions." Id.
442. Gabel, supra note 130, at 1084.
443. O'Connell & Barker, supra note 441, at 931.
444. See ARTHUR LARSON & LEx K LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
app. B tbl.6 (2004) (listing each of the states' benefit formulas, which indicate that, with
limited exceptions in Arizona, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Utah (which range from
about $5 to $15 per week) there is no increase in disability benefits based on marital
status).
445. O'Connell & Barker, supra note 441, at 931.
446. Eaton & Mustard, supra note 440, at 1290.
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pendents of deceased workers. Thirty-nine jurisdictions pay bene-
fits to a widow for life or until remarriage, and to children until
they reach age eighteen. The rest place limitations on the benefits
in terms of either amount or duration.""7 Further, "[u]nder most
statutes, a widow and young children living with the deceased
need prove only this relationship . . . [whereas] [o]ther eligible
claimants must usually prove actual dependency.
" "' Such a
showing "does not require proof that, without decedent's contribu-
tions, [the] claimant would have lacked the necessities of life, but
only that [the] decedent's contributions were relied on by [the]
claimant to maintain [his] accustomed mode of living.""
9 Al-
though forty states now have "mini-DOMA" laws excluding same-
sex couples from marriage (and, thus, benefits on that basis),
5 °
and a few states still hold the view that unmarried partners
(same or mixed-sex) cannot be "dependents" as a moral matter,
45'
many states are now quite flexible on who qualifies as a "depend-
ent" for compensation purposes, and this "view . . . seems to be
gaining strength."452
In light of the foregoing, there is no question that the legal
widow or widower, via their general presumptive right, obtains a
procedural advantage in acquiring death benefits under the sys-
tems just described. This right, however, is becoming increasingly
open, at least on a factual showing, by expanding "dependency"
alternatives to include unmarried couples .453 As one commentator
has concluded in this context, a "growing acceptance, particularly
of the spousal equivalent relationship of unmarried heterosexual
partners, demonstrates that state courts are modifying family
law concepts and other areas of law to mesh with the current so-
447. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 444, § 96.01 (footnotes omitted).
448. Id. at 96-1.
449. Id. § 97.01[3].
450. See Lynn D. Wardle, Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Judgments Under
DOMA and the Constitution, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv. 365, 370 (2005) (describing "DOMAs"
in forty states).
451. See, e.g., Williams v. Corbett, 398 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 1990) (unmarried cohabitation
does not yield worker compensation dependency benefits); Fields v. Hollowell & Hollowell,
78 S.E.2d 740 (N.C. 1953) (both cited in LARSON & LARSON, supra note 444, §§ 97.06[l]
n.2, 97.06[3] n.19, respectively).
452. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 444, § 97.06[31; see also, e.g., Dept. of Indus. Rels. v.
Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 156 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Ct. App. 1979); Kendall v. Hous. Auth. of
Baltimore, 76 A.2d 767 (Md. 1950); West v. Barton-Malow Co., 230 N.W.2d 545 (Mich.
1975); Parkinson v. J. & S. Tool Co., 313 A.2d 609 (N.J. 1974). These cases approve un-
married partner "dependency" for workers' compensation purposes.
453. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 444, § 97.06[3].
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cial reality of families."45 4 Same-sex couples may have a little far-
ther to go in this context,4 55 but any consensus on marriage as a
per se requirement, if it ever existed, is eroding. Furthermore, to
the extent that unmarried couples are still not recognized as "de-
pendents," the incidents of on-the-job deaths (as opposed to dis-
abilities, for which, as described above, there is typically no mar-
riage advantage) are becoming increasingly rare.456 As a result,
the actual benefits at issue seem less valuable, or at least less
common,457 than at the time when they were created.458
2. Unemployment Compensation
Unemployment compensation is a federally mandated and
state-run program of guaranteed, yet limited, financial assistance
in the event of a temporary job loss that is designed "to insure
diligent workers against the 'vicissitudes of enforced unemploy-
ment not voluntarily created without good cause.' 459 Its admini-
stration is as follows:
Federal laws provide general guidelines, standards, and require-
ments, with administration left to the states under their particular
unemployment legislation. The unemployment compensation system
is generally funded by unemployment insurance taxes or "contribu-
tions" imposed upon employers. The federal taxes are generally ap-
plied to the costs of administration, while the state taxes provide
trust funds for the payment of benefits.
460
454. Dominick Vetri, Almost Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Lesbians
and Gay Men, Their Families, and the Law, 26 S.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (1998).
455. See Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1508, 1618-19 (and accompanying notes) (1989) (observing trend of cohabitation recogni-
tion, but only one case (then) in same-sex context-Donovan v. Workers' Comp. Appeals
Bd., 187 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Ct. App. 1982)).
456. See Eaton & Mustard, supra note 440, at 1261 & tbl.2 (noting that "[s]ince 1994,
the number of fatal occupational injuries has decreased by 10.8%"). In 2000, out of a total
of 126 million covered workers, there were 5,915 fatal injuries. Id. at 1254, 1261 & 1612.
457. Cf M.V. Lee Badgett & R. Bradley Sears, Putting a Price on Equality? The Impact
of Same-Sex Marriage on California's Budget, 16 STAN. L. & POLy REV. 197, 223 (2005)
(estimating death benefits to same-sex couples in California civil servant context would
only result in one additional employee per year).
458. See Eaton & Mustard, supra note 440, at 1255 (noting that, at the time workers'
compensation arose in the United States, "It]he metaphor of war was often used to convey
the magnitude of industrial carnage").
459. Timothy J. Moroney & Tyson Shower, Insurance; Voluntary Unemployment-
Charges to Employers, 27 PAC. L.J. 893, 893 n.4 (1996) (citation omitted).
460. HOODETAL., supra note 411, at 141.
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In general, benefits are given to those recently employed (i.e.,
"generally one must have been employed [by a covered employer]"
and earned a minimum amount) when they are separated from
employment without misconduct either involuntarily or voluntar-
ily but with "good cause."461 Typically, benefits are based on a
percentage of "an employee's average weekly wage" up to dur-
ational and monetary maximums.46
2 At present, although the
states vary in calculating an "average weekly wage" and what
percentage thereof is the relevant compensation, most averaged
about one-half of the highest weekly rate in the past year.
463 Al-
though some states offer minor increases for dependents, only
eight include spouses, and even then, either essentially require a
spouse to be non-working (e.g., in Iowa, a spouse earning more
than $120 per week is ineligible) or provide so little benefit (e.g.,
$5 per week in Pennsylvania; $6 in Michigan) as to be virtually
negligible.4"
The arena in which marital rights have drawn the most fire,
though, is not benefit amounts, but interpretations of "good
cause" termination. More specifically, many states allow an em-
ployee compensation for what would otherwise be an ineligible
departure when leaving the job to marry, tend to a sick spouse, or
move with a spouse beyond reasonable commuting distance.
465
For example, in New York, "a married claimant who quits his or
her job in order to join a spouse whose employment has required
relocation has not left his or her employment under disqualifying
circumstances."466 Yet, not only do most states refuse to recognize
such exceptions,4 67 but a growing number of the ones that do in-
461. Id. at 142-43.
462. Id.
463. See EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., COMPARISON OF STATE
UNEMPLOYMENT LAwS 3-9 tbl.3-5 (2005) (providing "weekly benefit amounts" in each state,
which typically are 1/26 the highest amount earned in a quarter, or on average, a fifty per-
cent discount), available at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uilawcompar/
2005/comparison2005.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
464. See id. at 3-19 tbl.3-10, 3-20 tbl.3-11 (describing spousal unemployment benefits).
465. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights
and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1280-81
& n.68 (2001) (describing unemployment insurance in the event of a spousal move as a
benefit "historically reserved for spouses").
466. In re Di Napoli, 249 A.D.2d 665, 666-67 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
467. See EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., supra note 463, at 5-2 tbl.5-2 (noting that only six
states include marriage as "good cause;" twenty-one include "move with spouse" (yet, six
are "military spouses" only)).
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elude the unmarried in their coverage. 4" Thus, once again, the
relative benefits afforded to marriage in this context, at least na-
tionally, are not that great.
3. Insurance Access
In Baker v. State,469 where the Vermont Supreme Court struck
down that state's refusal to extend certain benefits of marriage to
same-sex couples, the court listed among such benefits "the op-
portunity to be covered" under life or health insurance policies of
a spouse.47 ° The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted
similar "medical policy" rights in Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health.471' Although there is no doubt that most employers
who offer employee benefits include spouses,472 and that this is
assisted by its tax-free status,473 such coverage, whether for sin-
gles or families, is not required by law,474 except in Hawaii.475 In
468. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West Supp. 2005) (including move with
"domestic partner" in "good cause" termination in California); Reep v. Comm'r of the Dep't
of Emp. & Training, 593 N.E.2d 1297 (Mass. 1992) (extending Massachusetts unemploy-
ment to cohabitor move); see also Sharon P. Stiller, Disqualifications Based on Conduct-
Voluntarily Leaving Employment-Marriage and Pregnancy, 1 N.Y. PRAC., EMP. L. N.Y. §
7:318 (2005) (noting as a New York "practice tip" the possible need to cover unmarried
partners on "marital status" discrimination grounds); EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., supra
note 463, at 5-2 tbl.5-2 (seventeen states include "[t]o [plerform [miarital, [diomestic, or
[flilial [o]bligations").
469. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
470. Id. at 884.
471. 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-56 (Mass. 2003).
472. Of the sixty-three percent of employers that offer health care coverage to employ-
ees, see KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 369, at 5, an overwhelming majority include
family coverage, see U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE:
COST INCREASES AND FAMILY COVERAGE DECREASES 9 (1997) (stating that about five per-
cent of employers have employee-only care), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
1977/he97035.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2006), even though the cost of such coverage is in-
creasingly borne by employees, see Milt Freudenheim, Fewer Employers Totally Cover
Health Premiums, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005, at C1 (noting twenty-seven percent rise in
family premiums).
473. See Knauer, supra note 32, at 169-70 (describing tax status of employee insurance
as marital benefit).
474. See Glied & Borzi, supra note 377, at 406 (noting "employer [health] coverage is
voluntary"). Many states or localities mandate coverage items, like alcoholism or mental
health, see RSM MCGLADREY, INC., MANDATED BENEFITS: 2005 COMPLIANCE GUIDE § 5.13
(2005), supplement COBRA continuation, see id. § 7.13, and even, perhaps more perti-
nently, require unmarried partners to be treated the same as spouses, see Renee M. Scire
& Christopher A. Raimondi, Note, Employment Benefits: Will Your Significant Other Be
Covered?, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 357, 364 (2000) (describing San Francisco rule for
public contracts). Yet, all of these are dependent on the choice of employers to offer insur-
ance in the first place (e.g., the San Francisco law, S.F. ADMIN. CODE, CH. 12B.1 (2004),
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fact, even if coverage were so mandated by state law, either for
singles or couples (mixed or same-sex), it would likely be pre-
empted by ERISA for most workers. As noted above, ERISA pre-
empts state regulation that "relate[s] to any employee benefit
plan."476 There is an exception for "insurance" rules, but not self-
insured plans,477 and thus, at least for about fifty-four percent of
insured workers covered by such plans,
478 there could be no man-
date for marriage regardless.
9 And again, even if it were re-
quired, it is doubtful that many unmarried couples would be en-
vious.480
4. "Marital Status" Discrimination
Although there is no ban on "marital status" discrimination in
federal law,48' currently twenty-one states and the District of Co-
lumbia have such laws.482 These provisions typically mirror the
available at http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sanfrancisco.shtml (last visited Feb. 22,
2006), only addresses "discrimination"). Moreover, to the extent such requirements 
affect
self-insured plans, they would most likely be preempted by ERISA. See RSM MCGLADREY,
INC., supra, § 5.13 (discussing ERISA preemption).
475. See HAW. REV. STAT. 88 393-7, 393-11 (1993 & Cum. Supp. 2004) (mandating 
em-
ployer-provided health care); see also Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Cross-Employee 
Distribu-
tion Effects of Mandated Employee Benefits, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 311, 
314 n.12
(2003) (noting "Hawaii is the only state" to mandate health care).
476. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
477. Id. § 1144(b)(2). As an aside, neither tax laws, see id. § 1144(b)(5)(B)(i), nor domes-
tic relations orders, see id. § 1144(b)(7), are preempted, and there is also a unique, limited
exception for the above-referenced regulation in Hawaii, see id. § 1144(b)(5)(A).
478. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 369, at 122.
479. See Brauch, supra note 436, at 961-62 (arguing ERISA preempts state/local 
do-
mestic partnership laws in welfare benefit plan context). But see Jennifer Bender, Note,
The Impact of ERISA on California Health Care Law Following the United States 
Supreme
Court's Pro-Preemption Interpretation, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 1169, 1185-88 (2005) 
(arguing
that paying for public coverage might "circumvent" preemption).
480. See Badgett, supra note 373, at 1 (noting minimal enrollment of unmarried 
part-
ners in benefit plans).
481. See Porter, supra note 55, at 3 (noting that "marital status is not one 
of the pro-
tected categories of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"). Although it is possible 
to
litigate marriage-related employment rules on other Title VII bases, such as a related 
dis-
parate treatment (e.g., only men can be married) or a disparate impact (e.g., a rule 
barring
employment of both spouses causes significantly more women than men to lose 
employ-
ment), it is not "marital status" that gives rise to such claims, but the category 
(e.g., gen-
der) actually protected by Title VII. See Joyce D. Edelman, Note, Marital Status 
Discrimi-
nation: A Survey of Federal Caselaw, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 347, 352-60 (1983) (describing
marriage-related "gender" claims in Title VII).
482. See Kohm, supra note 13, at 576 & n.69 (listing the twenty-one states that 
have
"marital status" laws); Porter, supra note 55, at 15-16 (noting same number of jurisdic-
tions in 2004).
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proscriptive language of Title VII (federal law) in it being illegal
"to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,"4 83 but
add "marital status" to its list of protected categories (i.e., race,
color, sex, religion, national origin).' As many scholars note,
however, most of these laws apply equally, at least on their face,
to "all employees whether they are married, single, divorced,
separated, or widowed."485 Moreover, in application, such provi-
sions have not only protected married workers, but "have played
a major role in protecting the rights of unmarried couples" " and
singles as well.48 7
"Marital status" discrimination laws, most of which were
passed in the 1970s,48 8 are widely noted for their lack of legisla-
tive history.4 9 For the most part, however, the focus of such legis-
lation can be said to be on extending to "marital status" the the-
ory of Title VII, namely protection from employment decisions
made for reasons unrelated to job performance or business neces-
sity.49° There is debate as to whether such laws are limited to
one's status as married or single, or whether they also extend to
the identity of one's mate (e.g., do they reach policies barring em-
ployment of a spouse?).491 Similarly, though some states might
protect unmarried pairs as such (i.e., extend protection to rela-
tionship choice or type), others only protect one's "single" status,
which is less likely to trigger a discrimination claim.492 Indeed,
483. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
484. See Porter, supra note 55, at 15 (noting state "marital status" laws "var[y] only
slightly" from Title VII).
485. Id. at 25.
486. Kohm, supra note 13, at 577. In addition to the unmarried couple as such, "mari-
tal status" laws can also prove particularly beneficial to unmarried women, especially un-
wed mothers.
487. See Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604, 610 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[Tjhe primary pur-
pose [of marital status discrimination laws] . .. is to prevent discrimination against mar-
ried women . .. ").
488. See Beattie, supra note 132, at 1418 (describing origin of state "marital status"
discrimination laws).
489. See Porter, supra note 55, at 16 (noting lack of legislative history on state "marital
status" laws).
490. See Edelman, supra note 481, at 360-61 (describing general approach of state
'marital status" laws).
491. See Beattie, supra note 132, at 1419-28 (comparing "narrow view" of status, not
partner identity, in upholding anti-nepotism, see Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York
State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 415 N.E.2d 950 (N.Y. 1980), with "broad view" including
identity, see Thompson v. Bd. of Trustees, 627 P.2d 1229 (Mont. 1981)).
492. See id. at 1430-31 (describing implications of anti-nepotism rulings in unmarried
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the very same "individual versus couple" debate is seen in places
with "sexual orientation" laws as well (i.e., is it only sexual pref-
erence or does the law extend to protect the identity, or gender, of
a partner or other relationship facts?).
493
Regardless of the resolution of the debate over their scope,
however, it is clear that the state and local laws concerning dis-
crimination on "marital status" do not do much to support mar-
riage. Indeed, to the extent that they exist at all (i.e., only a mi-
nority of states have them), they do not offer broad support for
marriage in themselves, but rather a "hodge-podge" of provisions
that, at most, protect all employees, married or not,
494 yet for
most, provide little protection at all.
4 95 Some have argued that by
offering a weak "marital status" law or even by failing to provide
one in the first place, many jurisdictions implicitly endorse em-
ployer preferences for marriage.
496 Perhaps one can so infer, but
in places where such passivity is the rule, it is ultimately the
market and the decisions of employers, and not the law, that
would deserve the blame (or credit).
5. Family Leave
As described above, the FMLA requires larger employers (i.e.,
those with fifty or more employees)
497 to offer up to twelve weeks
unpaid leave per year for a birth or adoption, the employee's own
illness, or to care for a sick spouse, child, or parent.
49 Although
this federal law dominates the relevant landscape, almost all
states (forty-two) have their own law for public workers and al-
partner setting).
493. See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. 
REV.
1568, 1633-38 (1996) (describing limits of "sexual orientation" law). At least fifteen 
states
and the District of Columbia have such laws. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
LAW 205 (2d
ed., 2004).
494. See Porter, supra note 55, at 25 (describing neutrality of "marital status" 
laws).
495. See id. at 33-34 (noting shortcomings of twenty-one states, and the District 
of Co-
lumbia, with "marital status" laws due to "different interpretations," and that 
the other
twenty-nine states have no such law at all).
496. See Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 
TEMP. L.
REV. 709, 790-92 (2002) (arguing that limited or absent "marital status" laws implicitly
endorse marriage preferences).
497. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2), (4)(A) (2000) (defining "eligible employee" 
and "em-
ployer").
498. See id. § 2612(a)(1) (setting forth general FMLA leave provisions).
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most half (twenty-three and the District of Columbia) have laws
in varying degrees for private workers.499 For the most part, these
laws supplement the FMLA, either in scope or in substance."0
Thus, while "the FMLA represents the minimum or basic package
of rights and obligations[,] ... [s]tates are free to exceed any spe-
cific provision of the federal law.""0' For example, as noted, the
FMLA's employee threshold is fifty, whereas Oregon requires
twenty-five,0 2 Iowa four,0 3 and Kansas has no minimum at all.50 4
As further example, the FMLA requires up to twelve weeks un-
paid family leave per year; and while some states offer more (e.g.,
California's is twelve weeks, but pays (via public funds) about
half an employee's wages for up to six weeks),55 most offer less,
albeit largely for employers with fewer workers50 6 (e.g., the Dis-
trict of Columbia offers sixteen weeks in a two-year period,0 7
Maine offers ten weeks in a two-year period,0 ' and Wisconsin of-
fers two to eight weeks a year depending on the reason).50 9
Notwithstanding the existence of these leave provisions, there
is reason to doubt the extent to which they provide particularly
fruitful benefits by virtue of marital status. First, as described in
the FMLA discussion, the taking of leave to care for a spouse, as
opposed to a child or one's self, is a very rare event.510 Second, al-
499. See RSM MCGLADREY, INC., supra note 474, at Ex. 14.2 (providing state leave re-
quirements, of which eighteen offer leave for public employees only, twenty-three and the
District of Columbia offer it to both public and private workers in varying degrees, and
nine have no such leave at all). For general guidance to statutes in this "family leave" sec-
tion, see id. and the material it cites to in JOHN F. BUCKLEY & RONALD M. GREEN, 2004
STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO HuMAN RESOURCES LAw (2004).
500. See RSM MCGLADREY, INC., supra note 474, § 14.17 (describing supplemental role
of state leave law).
501. Id.
502. See OR. REV. STAT. § 659A. 153 (2003) (defining "covered employer" for leave law).
503. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6 (West 2000) (describing available leave).
504. See KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 1-9-5 (2005) (providing schedule of"sick" leave).
505. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3301 (West Supp. 2005) (providing "[flamily tempo-
rary disability insurance").
506. See RSM MCGLADREY, INC., supra note 474, at Ex.14.2 (summarizing state leave
provisions).
507. See D.C. CODE § 32-502 (2001) (creating leave obligation of sixteen weeks in two
years for all employers).
508. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 844 (West Supp. 2004) (establishing "family
medical leave" of ten weeks in two years for those with "fewer than 15 employees").
509. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.10(3) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004) (establishing ranges of
family medical leave for various reasons for fifty-employee public or private employers).




though most states offer leave for public (i.e., their own) workers,
only about half require it for private workers. 11 Finally, of those
that actually extend leave benefits to private employees, most are
largely limited to childbirth, adoption, or one's own condition. 12
Indeed, of the twenty-four states that have "mini-FMLAs," only
eleven extend benefits based on spousal condition alone, 13 and, of
these, at least two (the District of Columbia and West Virginia)
include persons other than spouses who live with the employee.514
Thus, one must conclude that, as in the FMLA, marriage is not as
useful (or used) a source of rights as one might assume.
6. Wage Payment Laws
Apart from the minimum wage and overtime premium re-
quirements of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the
"FLSA"), 15 regulation of wages and their payment to workers is
largely a matter of state regulation. 6 Although such regulation
typically only affects the workers themselves, there are two small
areas in which marriage is implicated-the assignment of wages
and wage payments on separation or death. In general, the wage
assignment rules either require spousal consent before future
wages can be assigned to a third party for voluntary payment of a
debt517 or limit the amount of involuntary garnishment (if allowed
at all) by a third party if there is a dependent (e.g., a spouse).51
511. See RSM MCGLADREY, INC., supra note 474, at Ex.14.2 (describing leave provi-
sions, with forty-two states and the District of Columbia for public workers and twenty-
three (and the District of Columbia) for private workers also).
512. See generally DAVID G. EVANS, 1 FEDERAL AND STATE GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE
MEDICAL LEAVE BENEFITS AND DISABILITIES LAWS §§ 4:3-4:54 (2005) (describing all state
leave provisions).
513. See id. § 4:16 (Illinois), 4:18 (Iowa), 4:19 (Kansas), 4:20 (Kentucky), 4:21 (Louisi-
ana), 4:24 (Massachusetts), 4:26 (Minnesota), 4:29 (Montana), 4:31 (Nevada), 4:35 (New
York), 4:36 (North Carolina), 4:46 (Tennessee), and 4:51 (Washington), which are largely
limited to maternity and child care.
514. See RSM McGLADREY, INC., supra note 474, § 14.17[b] [4] (noting "immediate fam-
ily member" in the District of Columbia and West Virginia includes those "living with" the
employee, but not legally related).
515. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).
516. See generally STATE COMPENSATION LAWS (CCH) Vols. I & 11 (2004).
517. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 15-302 SuPP. (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 493.17 (West Supp. 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN § 241.09 (West 2001) (requiring spousal
consent to assign wages).
518. Federal law provides for a maximum garnishment exemption of fifty percent for
singles and sixty percent with a spouse or dependent. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2) (2000).
Many states offer statutes with similar providions. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
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The wage payment rules, on the other hand, provide that, in the
event of incapacity or death, any earned, yet unpaid, wages shall
be paid first to a spouse.51 9
Although the foregoing wage protections and payment rules are
no doubt helpful to some married couples, or at least the non-
employee spouse at issue, what they offer is not very significant.
First, although spousal consent is required for voluntary assign-
ment of wages (at least in some states), 20 this is a protection of-
fered to the "innocent" spouse, not the employee, and thus could
easily be contracted for by the unmarried.121 Second, while
greater wage amounts are protected from involuntary garnish-
ment in the case of married couples, such protection typically ex-
tends a mere additional ten percent of wages and is available for
a child as well,522 thus making it a helpful, yet not very profound,
temporary protection from debts . 2' Finally, although many states
provide for payment of unpaid wages to a spouse, these are typi-
cally in the form of default rules that do not provide anything
other than that to which the deceased worker (and, thereafter, his
or her estate) was otherwise entitled and the employer must pay
anyway.
524
Once again, in the wage context, it is particularly important to
note that neither federal nor state law requires any wage en-
hancements based on familial or marital status. Although the
FLSA mandates a minimum level of pay as well as enhanced
compensation for overtime, neither of these provisions includes
considerations of spouses or families.5 25 Further, although many
706.052(0) (West 1987 & Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-54-104(3)(b)(I)(A) (West
2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29 (bl)(2) (2005).
519. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.15(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 2005); GA. CODE ANN. §
29-5-12 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.190 (2003) (granting final wages to spouses).
520. See supra note 518.
521. See Buckley & Ribstein, supra note 95, at 597-600 (describing ability to contract
marriage "incidents").
522. See supra note 518 (listing state garnishment limits, all of which provide ten per-
cent more protection for those with a spouse or child (i.e., sixty percent of wages, rather
than fifty percent, shielded from garnishment)).
523. See 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 2 (2005) (describing the "garnishment" process).
524. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-2-103(a)(1) (2001) (stating that "[an employee
may designate a beneficiary" for unpaid wages at death); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-
1301 (LexisNexis 1995) (indicating that payment to spouse is designed to avoid probate
over unpaid wages that would otherwise be part of decedent's estate).




states and localities require higher minimum wages and overtime
premiums than the FLSA,526 none offer enhancements on either a
marital or a family basis.527 Indeed, although some states and lo-
calities even directly profess to require a "living" or "family"
wage,12 presumably based on expectations of economic depend-
ency or need,529 or even on moral grounds, 530 none treat married
workers differently, but rather all extend the benefits of higher
wages to single and married persons alike.5 3'
7. State and Local Income Tax
As described in the federal section above, income tax is, albeit
indirectly, a source of regulation of marriage in employment. As
such, the tax structure has the potential to encourage or subvert
marriage to the extent it is both taken into account and, in real-
ity, plays a role in economic and personal decision-making.532 As
detailed above, however, it seems that although federal law does
take marriage into account, its impact on workers, particularly
when considering the economic realities of most couples, is not
that great.5 33 For the most part, the same can be said for similar
taxation on state and local levels.
Both the "[fiederal and state income tax laws create a system of
joint returns for married couples that treats the couples as a sin-
526. See, e.g., Minor Myers III, A Redistributive Role for Local Government, 36 URB.
LAW. 753, 787 (2004) (indicating that "over 120 local jurisdictions" and twelve states ex-
ceed the minimum wages of federal law).
527. See Quigley, supra note 9, at 923-33 (cataloging existing "living wage" rates for
states and localities, all of which establish a base wage rate without regard to marriage or
familial status of particular individuals).
528. See Myers, supra note 526, at 786-87 (describing many local and state "living
wage" laws).
529. See id. at 787 (stating that "living wage" laws were designed for "'full-time wage-
earners to support a family residing in the locality at a subsistence level'") (quoting Rui
One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2004)).
530. See Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens [On Human Work] 19 (St. Paul, ed.
1981) (describing the "family wage" as one of several options in achieving "just remunera-
tion" for the family); see also Quigley, supra note 9, at 894-95 (describing religious dimen-
sion of "living wage" movement).
531. See Quigley, supra note 9, at 923-33 (listing applicable "living" and "minimum"
wage laws).
532. See GRAETZ, supra note 316, at 29-40 (describing potential impact on marriage of
federal taxation).
533. See Zelenak, supra note 297, at 365 (noting that the impact of "tax laws on deci-
sions to marry [is] unproven").
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gle economic entity."534 Although nine states do not tax work
compensation at all,535 those that do use federal filing (e.g., single,
joint) status. 6 In nineteen states and the District of Columbia,
such status is largely irrelevant in that rates apply to all
equally.537 Of the remaining states, fourteen double rates between
single and joint filers (i.e., marriage neutrality or "bonus"), while
eight expand ranges by less than that (i.e., a "marriage penalty"
more likely).53  As a result, in those twenty-eight states that do
not tax income or do not consider filing status in doing so, the
married and single are treated identically. In the remaining
twenty-two states that expand rates, the federal analysis offered
above applies equally in showing that most couples, especially the
unmarried, are dual-income and have increasingly similar earn-
ings; and, thus, would not benefit much from such rate expansion,
whether it is available or not. 9
As far as deductions and exemptions are concerned, the states
typically follow the federal rules,54° resulting in little advantage
to most couples. For example, personal deductions or exemptions
are generally available from states on a per capita basis, and
thus, as long as each individual member of a couple (or single)
earns income above the relevant personal deduction/exemption
amount, there is no discrimination on a marriage basis.54' Fur-
ther, although, as in the federal system, many employee benefits
534. Chambers, supra note 82, at 472.
535. See 3 STATE TAX GUIDE (CCH) 1700-075 (2005) (providing table of states with in-
come taxes).
536. See id. (federal filing options for each state with an applicable income tax).
537. See id. (listing state income tax rates).
538. See id. (listing state income tax rates).
539. See Buckley & Ribstein, supra note 95, at 599 ("[Tlax benefits of marriage matter
most to one-earner households .. .most homosexual couples form two-earner house-
holds."); Estin, supra note 72, at 1388 (noting that unmarried pairs are more likely than
married couples to be dual-earning with similar incomes); Whittington & Alm, supra note
314, at 457 (stating that similar earnings are reflected in a marriage penalty for forty-two
to sixty percent of couples).
540. See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2544, 2557
(2005) (observing that "[m]ost states rely upon federal definitions of adjusted gross income
or taxable income"); Kristian D. Whitten, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: Is
Marriage Reserved to the States?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 419, 452 (1999) ("The 40 states
with personal income taxes use the taxpayer's federal adjusted gross income as the 'com-
putational starting point' for determining state taxable income.").
541. See 71 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local Taxation § 480 (2001) (noting state and local
"[i]ncome tax laws usually allow a specified deduction, often termed a personal exemption,
or considered a credit against net income, on account of each person dependent on an indi-
vidual taxpayer for support") (citations omitted).
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offered to employees and their spouses are exempted from state
income tax,5"2 the ability, and, in fact, the apparent preference, of
unmarried partners to obtain their own benefits similarly dis-
counts claims of widespread discriminatory effect.54 3 Finally, to
the extent states or localities, if not the federal government, may
tend toward greater recognition of unmarried couples,544 any re-
maining power of such claims of discrimination would be dimin-
ished even further.
8. Civil Servants
The marriage-based rights and benefits afforded to state and
local workers largely mirror those noted for federal workers
above. Like their federal counterparts, these rights and benefits
typically include health coverage, survivor pension, disability or
death benefits, and family leave.5 45 And, according to current Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics data, the approximate numbers of these
workers are: 7.9 million in general service;5 46 one million in
health care;5 47 and eight million in education;5" or about eleven
percent of the workforce.549 These numbers are, indeed, larger
than those working for the federal government, and, certainly the
benefits just listed are not insignificant. And yet, not only are
such benefits more in the nature of voluntary employer policy,
542. Most employee benefits are exempted from "adjusted gross income" by 26 U.S.C.
§§ 101-139 (2000), and, thus, are excluded in most states too. See Super, supra note 540, at
2557 (stating that many states have adopted federal rules).
543. See BADGErr, supra note 379, at 83-84 (2001) (noting minimal enrollment of
same-sex pairs in partner benefit plans); Brines & Joyner, supra note 379, at 350 (observ-
ing independent nature of cohabitors).
544. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17021.7 (West 2003) (including "domestic part-
ner" as "spouse" for tax exclusions for certain benefits); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(b)
(2001) (extending the "spouse" definition to civil union members for state income tax pur-
poses); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (discussing
state marriage and treatment of same-sex couples).
545. See, e.g., Badgett & Sears, supra note 457, at 220 (listing benefits for married
California employees).
546. See BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., supra note 386, at 254 (listing the number of state
and local government workers, excluding education and hospitals).
547. See id. at 218 (estimating that eight percent of the 12.9 million worker health care
industry consist of state and local government workers).
548. See id. at 211 (estimating a total of 12.5 million educational workers, with about
seventy-five percent comprised of public primary and secondary education workers).
549. See Press Release, supra note 389, at 2 tbl.A (indicating a total civilian workforce
of 149.1 million; thus, 16.9 million public workers would be about eleven percent of the
total).
2006]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
they, like their federal counterparts, are not as uniquely valuable
to married couples as one might think, not only due to the in-
creasing rarity of their need or use among modern couples,5 ' but
also to their extension in many states and localities to unmarried
couples as well.55'
Once again, there is no doubt that single-worker (or underin-
sured) couples would take advantage of spousal health care if
they could, although the increasing lack of such couples, espe-
cially among the unmarried, certainly dilutes the real, or at least
disparate, value of the benefit. 2 With regard to pension, most
state plans mirror the federal system of a defined benefit plan553
with no increase in benefits based on marital status during a re-
tiree's life, but a widow(er) can receive survivor benefits at a re-
tiree's death.554 Yet, like the federal system and most other sys-
tems, such benefits are paid for by a lower benefit in the retiree's
life.555 States and localities also offer life or disability benefits to
spouses of most workers; yet, like federal workers, the amount
and incidence of actual benefits is low.556 Finally, most state and
550. See Collett, supra note 7, at 388-89 (noting the limited benefit of employer insur-
ance for dual-earner couples).
551. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Family Law, supra note 195, at 406-07 (noting
that as of April 2004, ten states and 130 city and county governments "provide[d] domestic
partner health benefits").
552. See Badgett & Sears, supra note 457, at 221 (noting that "one-half of one percent
of [California] state employees" have enrolled in civil servant benefits when opened to un-
married couples); Collett, supra note 7, at 388-89 (asserting "it is rarely advantageous" for
dual-income couples to enroll in a single health plan).
553. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Public Pensions: Choosing Between Defined Benefit
and Defined Contribution Plans, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 187, 188 (noting that
the 'overwhelming majority of [state and local government] workers are covered by de-
fined benefit plans").
554. M.V. Lee Badgett, Equality Is Not Expensive, CONN. L. TRIB., Apr. 19, 2004, at 23
(describing the survivor option for "state pension employee systems").
555. See id. (observing "state pension employee systems" are largely "defined benefit"
plans where "retirees themselves are paying for [any] survivor benefit" by virtue of lower
payments during a retiree's lifetime); see also AM. ASSOC. OF RETIRED PERSONS (AARP),
FALLING SHORT: A 50-STATE SURVEY OF SPOUSAL RIGHTS UNDER STATE PENSION PLANS 2
(2004) (noting survivor options of state plans results in "lower payments while the partici-
pant is alive"). Interestingly, such plans also lack one of the few spousal benefits that pri-
vate pensions give by way of their exemption from ERISA and its requirement of spousal
consent for waiver of the survivor benefit, with only eleven states having a similar rule.
See id. at 7.
556. See Pegula, supra note 410 (indicating 3227 local and 1224 state workers died on
the job between 1992 and 2001, including more than 300 on September 11, 2001). One
study in California on same-sex couples points out, "[elven high estimates of the impact of
this [public survivor] benefit [for such couples] suggest[s] that the budgetary impact will
be minimal." Badgett & Sears, supra note 457, at 230. With regard to disability, most
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local workers have family or bereavement leave;557 and yet, again,
like the other leave regimes described above, it is very unlikely
that such leave is used that much for a spouse (as opposed to
other family members or, in the case of medical leave, one's own
health condition),"' or comparatively speaking, would otherwise
be so used by an unmarried couple (if so extended).55 9
In addition to the foregoing, it should be noted that at least
fourteen states and 185 localities have extended many of these
rights and benefits, however small, to unmarried domestic part-
ners.56 ° Although there is some "ambiguity over who should or
will be covered when [such] benefits are extended,"56' there is no
doubt this expansion for civil servants limits the impact of any
marriage-based discrimination, whether real or perceived. And
again, as predicted, "[e]mployers that provide domestic partner
benefits have found that only 1% to 2% of eligible employees ac-
tually apply for coverage."
5 62
IV. PRIVATE RIGHTS AND BENEFITS
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, although the land-
scape is vast and, at times, confusing, there are very few direct
legal rights and benefits at work that attach to marriage. Indeed,
other than family leave, "employers are under no obligation to
provide spousal benefits at all."5 63 To be sure, the benefits that
employers voluntarily offer may be regulated, as in the case of
states extend workers' compensation to their workers, see LARSON & LARSON, supra note
444, § 78.01, yet, as in such compensation generally, there is only an increase in benefits
for dependents in a very few states (and a minor one at that), see id. at app. B tbl.6.
557. See RSM MCGLADREY, INC., supra note 474, at Ex.14.2 (listing leave in forty-two
states and the District of Columbia that have it, and noting almost all (about thirty-seven)
do not require paid leave for spouse care).
558. Cf Waldfogel, supra note 155, at 20 (noting that in 2000, 5.9% of FMLA leave was
for spousal care).
559. See Hein, supra note 80, at 31 (describing as "largely symbolic" municipal leave for
domestic partners).
560. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE FOR
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER AMERICANS 20 (2005) (noting 185 localities as
extending domestic partner health benefits as of 2004); Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Family
Law, supra note 195, at 380-96 (listing unmarried partner benefits in fourteen states,
while noting that three of these states only extend job leave).
561. Scire & Raimondi, supra note 474, at 369.
562. Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Family Law, supra note 195, at 406.
563. Hein, supra note 80, at 24.
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ERISA, or otherwise encouraged by government policy, as in the
case of income taxes, and traditional couples obtain some public
benefits by virtue of taxation either on their employers, as in the
case of workers' compensation, or their work generally, as in the
case of Social Security. Yet, the decision to offer benefits or rights
to employees directly, and in the first instance, is solely up to the
employer, and as such, the benefits provided are more a product
of negotiation and economics, and perhaps culture as well, than
positive law. Thus, "encouragement of a good, stable, healthy
marriage is neither legal nor illegal: It is good employment prac-
tice."" These benefits typically include health care, dental and
vision, life insurance, paid family/bereavement leave, flexible
scheduling, pension coverage, relocation benefits, and spousal
perks,565 and their prominence and importance to many of today's
workers is high.566 Yet, again, these are provided voluntarily-
567perhaps encouraged by law, or in "answer to employee pres-
sure"568 or the dictates of the market569-but voluntarily nonethe-
less.570
Generally speaking, "[diespite the lack of legally required bene-
fits packages, most employers provide paid vacation days, sick
leave, pension plans, and employer-sponsored health insurance to
their full-time, permanent employees."571 For spouses who elect to
participate, such benefits typically extend to provide health care,
benefits in the event of their spouse employee's death (e.g., bene-
ficiary status for life insurance or pension), and access to their
spouse in times of need (e.g., paid leave, flexible scheduling). For
the most part, the benefits that are more personal to the spouse,
564. Kohm, supra note 13, at 582.
565. See Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Family Law, supra note 195, at 405 (listing private
benefits).
566. See, e.g., Press Release, Bureau of Lab. Stats., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employer Costs
for Employee Compensation-March 2005, 1 (June 16, 2005) (on file with author) (indicat-
ing that benefits average 29.6% of total compensation).
567. See Pettit, supra note 125, at 784 (noting influence of tax-exempt treatment in
health care arena).
568. See Scire & Raimondi, supra note 474, at 372 (noting role of employee pressure for
benefits).
569. See Crain, supra note 68, at 1953 (asserting that work/family benefits are only
adopted to the extent they "are seen as 'strategic tools for competitive advantage'" (foot-
note omitted)).
570. See Glied & Borzi, supra note 377, at 406 ("Coverage depends on the willingness of
one's employer.").
571. Andrea H. Brustein, Comment, Casual Workers and Employee Benefits: Staying
Ahead of the Curve, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 695, 696 (2005).
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such as health, dental, or vision care, or even insurance on one's
own life will generally require contributions by the spouse, the
employee, or both. 2 Moreover, there have been trends to cut
back on benefits, spousal or otherwise, or at least to increase the
contributing cost to employees. 73 Nevertheless, such benefits can
still be important, particularly to more traditional one-income
couples. 7 This is all the more true as such couples face retire-
ment.575
To the extent unmarried couples are not otherwise voluntarily
afforded these same benefits, there is, no doubt, some disparate
treatment (albeit perfectly legal in almost every jurisdiction).
7 6
And yet, not only are many such benefits not viewed as that valu-
able by these populations (as in the civil servant arena above),
5 7
but more employers than ever (if offering benefits at all) are vol-
untarily extending benefits to unmarried pairs, same-sex or oth-
erwise, anyway, thus further limiting discrimination claims in
this context.5 7 For example, in 2004, the Human Rights Cam-
paign Foundation found that 8,250 employers, including 216 of
the Fortune 500, offered health benefits to unmarried pairs, up
"13 percent" from a year before.5 9 To be sure, such extensions
have been largely market-driven, but has it not always been the
case that "employers must offer competitive benefit packages to
572. See, e.g., BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., supra note 378 at 30 tbl.22, 31 tbl.23 (stating
that the average employee health care contribution for singles is $60.24, while for families
(including spouses) it is $228.98).
573. See Elizabeth A. Pendo, Images of Health Insurance in Popular Film: The Dissolv-
ing Critique, 37 J. HEALTH L. 267, 285 (2004) (citing data that "employers are cutting
health insurance benefits for employee spouses and children, or offering incentives to get
families out of their health plans"); see also KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 369, at 5
(summarizing data indicating declines in health coverage).
574. Cf. Hein, supra note 80, at 21-22 (noting importance of benefit packages to mod-
em couples); Collett, supra note 7, at 388-89 (noting by inference that spousal health cov-
erage is more important for traditional couples).
575. See Schultz, supra note 177, at B1 (describing importance of retiree benefits to
one-income couples).
576. See Paul R. Lynd, Domestic Partner Benefits Limited to Same-Sex Couples: Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 561, 574-75, 579-81 (2000)
(citing general legality of affording benefits to spouses only, even under otherwise applica-
ble "marital status" or "sexual orientation" statutes).
577. See Badgett, supra note 373, at 1 (noting minimal enrollment of unmarried part-
ners in benefit plans).
578. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., supra note 560, at 15 (describing current
trends in domestic partner health care coverage).
579. Id.
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attract and retain top employees"?8 ° Indeed, in the modern
world, "employers face heightened competition in attracting the
best employees" and "must respond to the specific needs of an in-
creasingly diverse work force."58'
It is perhaps the foregoing broad extension of rights and bene-
fits by employers on a voluntary basis that leads many to the im-
pression that such treatment is mandated by law. As the above
federal, state, and local law discussion demonstrates, however,
this is simply not the case, either in form or in function. Indeed,
those who claim that marriage is afforded an unfairly "privileged"
status in many employment settings may have some basis to
their critique as a philosophical matter, but their primary tar-
gets, if any, should be employers, the private marketplace, and,
perhaps, even the culture,582 but not the law.
V. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
In light of the foregoing exploration of marriage rights and
benefits, at least to the extent they exist, we are given a fairly
clear picture of the present state of both our family and legal cul-
tures. As Professor Mary Ann Glendon has noted, the traditional
model of marriage, wherein "[flamily solidarity and the commu-
nity of life between spouses were emphasized over the individual
personalities and interests of family members,"8 3 has evolved
over the past century to a model that "now treats marriage as
primarily the concern of the individuals involved."584 Indeed, the
past thirty years "have witnessed the movement from undercur-
rent to mainstream in family law of individualistic, egalitarian,
and secularizing trends."585 And, marriage in the workplace, ei-
580. J. Robert Cowan, Note, The New Family Plan: Employee Benefits and the Non-
Traditional Spouse, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 617, 632 (1994); see also PATRICIA H.
WERHANE ET AL., EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 187 (2004) ("Gay [and] lesbian...
employees are a rich source for talent.").
581. Hein, supra note 80, at 27.
582. See George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581,
592-93 (1999) (emphasizing the symbolic, rather than practical, importance of the right to
marry).
583. GLENDON, supra note 23, at 291.
584. Id. at 293.
585. Id. at 292.
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ther by legal design or as a result of cultural changes in marriage
generally,"8 6 has followed suit.
As demonstrated above, the only legally mandated benefits of
any real substance that are available to married couples, at least
indirectly, in the workplace arise from the federal Social Security
and income tax systems. Yet, both of these systems presume a
form of economic interdependency that has become increasingly
rare." 7 Thus, it is not that surprising to find that neither of these
benefits are as valuable to modern married couples as they once
were, nor would they be to unmarried ones even if they were to be
extended as such. 88 The more limited, or rarer, benefits, such as
spousal leave, benefit and wage protections, and workers' com-
pensation and unemployment rights are similarly based on a tra-
ditional dependency model, and, thus, are (or would be) also of lit-
tle use to modern couples.8 9 Some may argue for extension of
such benefits to meet the different needs of such couples,
59° but
few can dispute their growing limits as now constituted.
Interestingly, it is more likely that, at least in employment,
most of the reduced impact of the rights and benefits that actu-
ally do exist comes from changes in the culture of marriage gen-
erally (or at least in other areas of law-e.g., no-fault divorce, pri-
vacy)5 9' than the other way around. Apart from family leave, most
of the laws described above were adopted decades ago (when the
sole breadwinner model was the norm) and have not changed
much since.5 92 Thus, their utility, at least as conceived, has neces-
586. See Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 56
(1995) (noting "under ten percent of families with children under age eighteen conform to
the pattern of a single male breadwinner"); Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Re-
alistic Definition of"Family", 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91, 92 (1991) ("Social institutions and the
law have not kept up with the changes in family life.").
587. See Chambers, supra note 82, at 474-75 (noting Social Security presumption of
economic dependency).
588. See Dent, supra note 582, at 592 (describing tax and Social Security as "minor"
things that "most couples hardly consider ... in deciding whether to marry").
589. See Crain, supra note 68, at 1918 (citing presumption of traditional male bread-
winner model behind the public benefits for marriage); see also id. at 1877 n.3 (noting that
most married couples are dual-earning).
590. See generally Martha T. McCluskey, Caring for Workers, 55 ME. L. REV. 313, 326-
27 (2002) (summarizing the arguments for extending marriage-based benefits beyond the
traditional model).
591. See generally Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The
Waning of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1 (describing shift in law and culture from the
community to the individual).
592. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 214-15 (1977) (summarizing 1939 amend-
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sarily waned as mutual independence, contract, and privacy have
advanced.593 Whether purposeful or not, the limited impact for
most couples of the foregoing laws that actually do exist (e.g.,
joint tax status, spousal Social Security, unpaid leave) coupled
with other potentially more significant provisions that do not
(e.g., marital wage, mandatory benefits, paid leave) represents an
approach to marriage that leaves things largely in the hands of
employers and employees in this context. This is not to say that
the state has not grown in influence and regulation of marriage in
other areas,594 but only that the workplace is not one.
As described in Part II above, marriage is still very much im-
pacted by many areas of law, whether it be in property, torts,
family law, estate law, or tax provisions affecting family wealth
generally, if not compensation in particular.595 Yet, to the extent
marriage has become more like a partnership of persons than a
community affair necessarily linked with child-rearing,596 it is
understandable that the workplace, with its attendant rights and
benefits, would become more the domain of the working partner
than the pair or, for that matter, the state. Indeed, unlike prop-
erty, torts, family law, estate law, and tax, which generally con-
cern either the relationship among spouses (and children) or be-
tween them and the state, 97 employment law, at least as
understood in modern-day America, is focused almost entirely on
rights of the individual employee vis-A-vis an employer.5 9 Thus,
in the end, it is not surprising that, although many areas of law
continue to affect the marital form (albeit in different ways than
ments to provide spouse Social Security benefit); Zelenak, supra note 297, at 346 (describ-
ing adoption of joint tax filing in 1948).
593. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, INDVIDUALS, AND THE
LAW 146 (2004) (noting the rise of "individualism," "privacy," and the "ideology of choice"
in modern culture).
594. See GLENDON, supra note 23, at 295 ("In the process of withdrawing regulation
from some areas of family life while subjecting others to new forms of official intervention,
the law has tended to focus primarily on individuals.").
595. Cf. ESKRIDGE, supra note 105, at 142-43 (describing marriage rights under vari-
ous areas of law).
596. See Hafen, supra note 591, at 4-5 (describing cultural and legal shift of marriage
to individual interests).
597. See generally Chambers, supra note 82, at 474 (describing most marriage-based
laws as focusing on the emotional attachment of spouses, parenting, or the economic rela-
tions of the couple itself or with the state).
598. See, e.g., Rachel Geman, Safeguarding Employee Rights in a Post-Union World: A
New Conception of Employee Communities, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 369, 385 (1997)
(noting that "current employment law focuses on individual employees").
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the past), the influence of employment law, as described above, is
far more limited. And, unless we either turn back the clock to the
marriage paradigm of "breadwinner with dependent spouse"
(which could be anathema to progressives) or expand family
wages, mandatory benefits, and paid leave to all, including same-
sex couples (which could be anathema to traditionalists), the
situation should remain stable for some time. And, perhaps in
light of the great volatility of many of the underlying issues at
stake, the present balance makes a certain kind of sense.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law offers few workplace rights and benefits to marriage as
such. There is no marriage-based increase in wages or benefits,
and the potential assistance that is available is largely limited to
indirect public benefits and incentives that are becoming increas-
ingly irrelevant to most modern couples. To be sure, marriage is
an institution that has always been pursued and cherished by our
nation, and this will likely continue to be the case for the rest of
its history. In the workplace, however, the shift to individual from
community in both legal and cultural conceptions of marriage has
made its mark, and the result, at least in this arena, is one that
favors private choice over public subsidy.
Much of the existing scholarship that touches on marriage at
work tends to focus on the question of whether there should be
benefits for marriage in this arena, with some scholars in support
and others opposed. To be sure, these discussions are worthwhile
and often go to the heart of the matter in the present battle over
the future of marriage, a fight whose resolution will likely have a
lasting impact not only on our nation, but on the world as a
whole. Yet, as proposed herein, rather than immediately arming
for such a battle (at least on this front), perhaps the first question
that should be asked is whether there are benefits for marriage in
the work context, and the answer, as indicated above, is "Very
few"-and, perhaps more importantly for the marriage debate at
large, far fewer than many, on all sides, have often assumed.
Marriage and "equal treatment under law" are banners under
which an important public debate is underway, and both are
critical to our nation and its way of life. In light of the realities
explored above, however, it is hoped that a little more calm will
be brought to bear in the struggle-at least in the workplace.
20061

